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This is a common question from clients involved in litigation – – especially estate litigation. As a general rule, a party cannot recover attorney’s fees for successfully prosecuting or defending a lawsuit. This is the “American Rule,” and it is engrained in our legal system. New York courts are wary of deviating from the American Rule, and will only do so under certain circumstances, such as (1) where the dispute litigated arises out of a contract, and the contract expressly provides for recovery of attorney’s fees; or, (2) where an applicable statute or rule expressly and unambiguously permits recovery of attorney’s fees.

Award of Legal Fees Pursuant to Contract

Sometimes, parties to a contract will agree that the “prevailing party” to any litigation arising out of the contract may recover legal fees incurred in the litigation. This begs the question – – what does “prevailing party” mean? The courts have defined a “prevailing party” as the party that succeeded on the central relief sought, or prevailed on the central claims advanced and received a substantial remedy.

Once the court identifies the “prevailing party” it will fix the legal fee. The attorneys for the “prevailing party” will apply for an award of fees and the court will permit recovery of a reasonable legal fee after considering several factors. Some courts have held that the most important factor in fixing the reasonable legal fee of a “prevailing party” is the “degree of success obtained.”  It follows that a “prevailing party” who achieved only modest success on its claims advanced and relief sought should not recover the same measure of legal fees as a prevailing party who achieved total victory on all claims advanced and requests for relief.

In deference to the American Rule, the courts narrowly construe contracts that provide for recovery of legal fees. In some cases, attorneys have attempted to recover attorney’s fees for their time and effort in making an application for an award of fees. However, the courts have made it clear that legal fees for time and effort incurred in making a legal fee application will not be awarded absent unmistakably clear language in the contract permitting recovery of same.  

Award of Legal Fees Pursuant to Statute

There are statutes in various contexts that provide for an award of attorney’s fees. Like contractual fee shifting provisions, such statutes have been narrowly construed.

With respect to estates and trusts, the fiduciary stands in a unique position. The fiduciary who incurs legal fees in discharging his or her fiduciary responsibilities may pay such fees from the estate (to the extent that they are reasonable and always subject to court review). For example, a nominated executor generally may pay legal fees incurred in seeking the probate of the decedent’s will from the decedent’s estate. Legal fees incurred by an executor or trustee who files a formal judicial accounting with the court seeking approval and discharge, and litigates over objections in the accounting proceeding, are also generally a proper charge to the estate. The Surrogate’s Court considers the following factors in fixing a fiduciary’s attorney’s fees: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to handle the problems presented; (3) the lawyer’s experience, ability and reputation; (4) the amount involved and benefit resulting to the client from the services; (5) the customary fee charged by the Bar for similar services; (6) the contingency or certainty of compensation; (7) the results obtained; and, (8) the responsibility involved.

In certain litigations, where a beneficiary’s attorney brings a benefit to the estate, the Surrogate’s Court may grant an award of fees from the estate.

Moreover, as my colleagues, and others, have observed, in certain instances, the Surrogate’s Court may direct the source of payment of legal fees of the fiduciary to beneficiaries or distributees depending on several factors, namely: (1) whether the objecting beneficiary acted solely in his or her own interest or in the common interest of the estate; (2) the possible benefits to the individual beneficiaries from the outcome of the underlying proceeding; (3) the extent of the individual beneficiary’s participation in the proceeding; (4) the good (or bad) faith of the beneficiary; (5) whether there was justifiable doubt regarding the fiduciary’s conduct; (6) the relative interest of the objecting beneficiary in the estate; and (7) the effect of allocating fees on the interest of the individual beneficiary. Thus, where one beneficiary objects to a fiduciary’s administration of the estate, and those objections are without merit, the legal fees incurred in connection with defending such objections may be charged against the objecting beneficiary’s share of the estate.

Mental Hygiene Law Article 81 governs guardianships, and allows for a petitioner’s legal fees to be paid from the assets of the incapacitated person where the petitioner secures the appointment of a guardian for an incapacitated person or otherwise brings a benefit to the incapacitated person (MHL 81.16 [f]). It further allows reasonable legal fees incurred by a movant who succeeds in removing a guardian for cause (MHL 81.35). Further, it permits charging a petitioner with the attorney’s fees incurred by court-appointed counsel for an alleged incapacitated person where the petition is dismissed or withdrawn (MHL 81.10[f]). Like all statutory provisions that provide for an award of legal fees, these provisions are narrowly construed. For example, MHL 81.10 [f] only allows recovery of legal fees of court-appointed counsel for an alleged incapacitated person; the courts have rejected an expansive view of Mental Hygiene Law 81.10 [f] to allow recovery of the legal fees of an alleged incapacitated person’s retained counsel.

Finally, the courts will sometimes shift attorney’s fees and costs as a sanction for frivolous litigation conduct.  Allegations of frivolous litigation conduct have become common to the point of being meaningless – – it has become the standard practice for some attorneys to seek sanctions against parties and attorneys who disagree in good faith on a point of law, or who dare to adduce evidence in defense of a cause of action that contradicts or refutes the allegations forming the basis of that cause of action. However, the courts will occasionally shift fees for truly frivolous litigation conduct.

As the year draws to a close, I sometimes recall the stresses of final exam season from my law school days. In the spirit of reminiscence, I’ll pose a quick final-exam-like fact pattern:

Jane owned a parcel of real property in New Hyde Park, title to which she transferred in June 2002 to her irrevocable lifetime trust. Jane listed the New Hyde Park property on Schedule A to the trust agreement, and also executed and recorded a deed transferring the property to her trustees. The trust agreement provides that upon Jane’s death, the remaining corpus of the trust is to be divided among her two children, Nancy and Thomas, in equal shares per stirpes. Nancy and Thomas are specifically named as remainder beneficiaries under the trust agreement.

In February 2013, Thomas predeceased Jane, leaving no spouse or issue, and having no will.

In January 2014, Jane created a will which included a general bequest of all of her real property and her residuary estate to her three grandchildren, Scott, John and Jessica, the children of Nancy.

Jane died in July 2014. At Jane’s death, her irrevocable trust was still in existence and the deed to the New Hyde Park property was still in the name of the trustees of Jane’s trust. Scott sought admission of Jane’s January 2014 will to probate and received preliminary letters testamentary. Assuming admission of Jane’s January 2014 will to probate, who will receive title to the New Hyde Park property?

If you want to cheat, the answer can be found in a recent Nassau County Surrogate’s Court decision, Matter of Wilder (NYLJ, September 3, 2015, p.25, col.6). The crux of the dispute decided by Surrogate McCarty was that both Nancy, as trustee and beneficiary of Jane’s irrevocable trust, and Scott, as preliminary executor and a legatee of Jane’s estate, claimed an interest in the New Hyde Park property.

Nancy asserted that the property was owned solely by the trust and should pass 100% to her. As the trust distribution is to be per stirpes, she referred to EPTL 1-2.14, which provides:

“The property so passing is divided into as many equal shares as there are (i) surviving issue in the generation nearest to the deceased ancestor which contains one or more surviving issue and (ii) deceased issue in the same generation who left surviving issue, if any. Each surviving member in such nearest generation is allocated one share.”

Nancy claimed that the per stirpetal division and distribution should be made at her generation level, as it was the nearest to Jane and contained both surviving and deceased members. Since Thomas did not leave issue, Nancy argued only one share should be created, passing entirely to her as the sole surviving trust beneficiary.

Conversely, Scott asserted that 50% of the New Hyde Park property was owned by Jane at her death and should pass to her grandchildren pursuant to her January 2014 will. Scott claimed that because the trust was irrevocable and the remainder over to Nancy and Thomas was not conditioned upon their survival, a 50% interest in the New Hyde Park property vested immediately and absolutely in Thomas upon transfer of the real property to the trust. When Thomas died, his estate owned that 50% real property interest and it ultimately passed by intestacy to his sole intestate distributee, his mother Jane. Thus, Scott argued, when Jane bequeathed her real estate by her will, this 50% interest in the New Hyde Park property passed to her grandchildren.

Who was right? Neither, party entirely. As with many final exam questions, the fight over interests in the New Hyde Park property was a red herring. The Surrogate clarified that the dispute at issue was properly over a 50% remainder interest in Jane’s trust, not a 50% interest in the New Hyde Park property. Whether Thomas had any interest when he died, it would only have been an interest in the remaining trust property, not the New Hyde Park property transferred to the trust. For example, the New Hyde Park property could have been sold by the trustee and neither Thomas, nor his estate, would have standing to prevent that.

But the question still remained whether Thomas had any remainder interest in Jane’s trust even though he predeceased Jane. Surrogate McCarty noted EPTL 2-1.15 which provides that when the remainder of a trust passes to two or more designated beneficiaries and such remainder provision is ineffective in part, without an alternative disposition, the ineffective portion passes to the remaining designated beneficiaries. Thus, if the trust remainder provision was ineffective as to Thomas, due to his predeceasing Jane, the trust remainder would pass entirely to Nancy as the sole remaining beneficiary. If, however, the trust remainder portion for Thomas vested both immediately and indefeasibly, the trust remainder provision would have been effective despite Thomas’ death, and EPTL 2-1.15 would not apply.

The Surrogate next determined that Thomas’ remainder interest in the trust vested immediately upon the trust’s creation because Thomas was specifically named, and this creates a strong inference of vesting. As for whether the vesting was indefeasible, the words “per stirpes” created a potential condition for defeasance of Thomas’ vested interest, because they indicated Jane’s intent that Thomas’ death might lead to his issue taking his previously vested share. Thus Thomas’ lack of issue became the deciding factor.

The Surrogate rejected Nancy’s interpretation of the per stirpes provision under EPTL 1-2.14. The term per stirpes provides for division among a class of persons, and it is not possible to make a per stirpetal ‘division’ among one person. If Thomas had died with issue, then a class would have existed and a per stirpetal division could have been made. Since Thomas had no issue, the per stirpes provision is not operative. Moreover, the “per stirpes” qualification language in the trust agreement meant that Thomas’ vested interest would only be defeated if Thomas both (1) died before Jane, and (2) died leaving issue surviving him. Since both conditions were not satisfied, Thomas’ previously vested interest in the trust remainder was not defeated by his death. As a result, Thomas’ estate would be entitled to a 50% remainder interest in the trust, which would pass to Jane by intestacy and be disposed of by her will.

How did you score on the exam? More importantly, perhaps, despite the legal logic of the result, do you think this is the result Jane intended? Jane’s property ultimately remained in her family, but would your answer to that final question have been different if Thomas had made a will giving his property to a non-family member? As with most exam-type fact patterns, careful trust drafting could have prevented the dispute.

A recent decision of the Richmond County Surrogate’s Court addressed a frequently litigated issue in Surrogate’s Court litigation – – whether the proposed or nominated fiduciary should be disqualified from serving in a fiduciary capacity on the grounds of “dishonesty” or “improvidence.” In the Estate of George Mathai a familiar dynamic was in play – – there was a dispute between the decedent’s children from a prior marriage and the decedent’s surviving spouse. The decedent’s two children from a prior marriage objected to the appointment of their step-mother as Administrator of the decedent’s estate. They claimed that she was unfit to serve as fiduciary on the grounds of dishonesty, hostility, and improvidence.

At the outset, the court noted that the decedent’s surviving spouse was first in the order of statutory priority to serve as Administrator under SCPA §1001(a). However, the statute gives parties interested in a decedent’s estate the opportunity to object to the appointment of a fiduciary, where the fiduciary “does not possess the qualifications required of a fiduciary by reason of substance abuse, dishonesty, improvidence, want of understanding, or…is otherwise unfit for the execution of the office.”

With the decedent’s children objecting to the appointment of their step-mother, the question became what, in this context, do the statutory terms “dishonesty,” and “improvidence” mean?

Addressing “dishonesty,” the Surrogate explained that in order to prove that a potential fiduciary is dishonest “it must be shown that the person has a tendency or ‘habit of mind’ toward wrongful action.”   An act of isolated wrongdoing is not enough to disqualify a fiduciary from serving on the basis of “dishonesty.” It must be shown that there was dishonesty in money matters to such an extent that it would lead to a reasonable apprehension that the estate would not be safe.

Addressing “improvidence” the court quoted earlier decisions where it was observed that “the quality of being improvident does not necessarily involve moral turpitude,” and that defined improvident acts as those that “would be likely to render the estate unsafe and liable to be lost or diminished.” The court further explained that misappropriation or mishandling of the decedent’s property falls within the meaning of improvidence.

In the Estate of George Mathai, the decedent’s children could not meet their burden of showing dishonesty or improvidence to disqualify their step-mother. Additionally, while they claimed that their step-mother should not be appointed on the grounds of hostility, the court dismissed their objection, repeating the rule that mere hostility between the fiduciary and the beneficiaries is not grounds for disqualification; hostility will only serve as a basis for disqualification where it jeopardizes the proper administration of the estate.

In this regard, it is worth noting that courts are mindful of beneficiaries or distributees seeking to impose their preference of fiduciary contrary to the testator’s choice of fiduciary (or contrary to the statutory order of priority) through their own misconduct. In this regard, beneficiaries are not permitted to bootstrap their own unreasonableness, hostility, and misconduct into a claim for disqualification or removal on the grounds of friction and hostility. As the New York County Surrogate’s Court has pointed out:

Courts are also loathe to indulge a beneficiary’s wish to dictate, at will or at whim, who the fiduciary should or will be. After all, where there is a clash between beneficiary and fiduciary, it is the latter who faces the potential for liability; it may be presumed therefore that the prospect of a surcharge will chasten the fiduciary to try to do right on an issue as to which the beneficiary him/herself is free to be wrong. As a corollary, a beneficiary should not be allowed to bootstrap his or her way to a new fiduciary by intentionally antagonizing the current fiduciary.

In Matter of Brigati, Surrogate Czygier of Suffolk County addressed an application to reform the decedent’s life insurance trust, which contained a significant amount of insurance. The instrument contained a number of terms which could cause inclusion in the decedent’s gross estate. Among other things, it provided that upon the death of the Grantor, the life insurance policy proceeds should be distributed to the Grantor’s executor “so he may pay any estate, inheritance, transfer, succession or death taxes.” 

The court had before it an affidavit from the Trust draftsman indicating that he knew the Grantor for a number of years and the purpose of the Trust was to exclude assets from his taxable estate. On top of that, the instrument itself had an article entitled “Overriding Tax Purpose,” which specifically stated that the purpose of the Trust was to exclude the life insurance proceeds from the Grantor’s gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. 

The court, reciting the general law allowing it to correct mistakes, and relying heavily on the clearly stated purpose of the Trust instrument, allowed reformation to replace the erroneous language with substitute language which would carry out the purpose of the Trust. 

The Pre-Nuptial Agreement entered into by decedent provided that on his death, 70% of the value of his gross estate would be left to trusts to be established for his children “upon such terms and conditions as husband shall specify in his Last Will and Testament.” He died a number of years later at a young age as a result of an accident, leaving two infant children. He died without a Will. 

The Westchester County Surrogate’s Court in Matter of Bruan, 2012 NY Slip Op 22020 decided on January 26, 2012, granted an application to permit payment from the Estate to a proposed inter vivos trust to be created for the children despite the lack of specificity in the Pre-Nuptial Agreement as to the terms of the Trust. In what appears to have been an uncontested application, the Court was asked to approve the transfer of funds to two proposed irrevocable trusts for each of the infant children, each of which provided the Trustees with full discretion to pay or apply income or principal for the benefit of the particular child with payments of principal at ages 25, 30 and 35. The beneficiaries were granted a Power of Appointment, and in default the remainder is payable to his or her descendants and if none, to the surviving sibling. Citing Matter of Topping, 36 Misc 2d 991 (Sur Ct, Suffolk County 1962), the Court stated that “no particular words are required in order to create a trust. What matters is that decedent’s intent to create a trust relationship is established” (Matter of Bruan at *3). The Court found that the agreement clearly set forth three of the necessary elements of a trust: (1) designation of beneficiaries; (2) identification of trustees; and (3) the subject matter of the trust.

The Court, however, noted that the proposed inter vivos trust contained clauses which the Court believed would not be enforceable had the decedent created them under a will. These included an exoneration of the fiduciary under certain circumstances (not permitted in a will under EPTL §11-1.7); Waiver of Court approval for resignation (SCPA §715); waiver of the duty to account; and a prohibition from removing Trust assets from New York (SCPA §710(4)).

The Court granted the application to fund the Trust subject to the revisions noted. 

This is my third “dog pun” post in as many years. 

If you’ve read this blog since its inception, or have merely been sniffing through the archives, then know that real estate heiress Leona Helmsley left $12 million in her will in trust for her four-legged friend, Trouble. She also created a charitable trust valued at between $5-8 billion. In a two-page mission statement, she expressed her desire that the trust funds be used for the care and welfare of dogs. 

In my post dated December 31, 2008 — titled “Leona’s Wishes May Be Thrown To The Dogs” — I opined that a court might construe the mission statement as constituting merely a precatory request, not a mandatory directive. On February 26, 2009, in my post titled “A Sop For Cerberus”, I reported that in an “advice and direction” proceeding, New York County Surrogate Troy Webber had indeed decided that Ms. Helmsley’s trustees had the discretion to distribute the funds to charities as they saw fit, not just to canine causes.

Not content to let sleeping dogs lie, however, four animal welfare charities sought to intervene in the proceeding after the fact and vacate the court’s decision. They argued to the court that their causes were insufficiently protected by the New York State Attorney General and that they should have an opportunity to be heard in the matter. However, in a Decision and Order dated April 15, 2011, Surrogate Nora Anderson denied their application.

Essentially, the court found no reason to depart from the general rule that possible trust beneficiaries or members of a class of possible beneficiaries do not have standing to participate in court proceedings to enforce the provisions of the trust. The court also rejected the proposed intervenors’ argument that they fell within a narrow exception to that general principle, affording standing to a particular group with a special interest in funds held for a charitable purpose. Instead, as the court explained, by statute the Attorney General is conferred with the authority to represent all possible unnamed charitable beneficiaries. Further, the court rejected the charities’ argument that the Attorney General failed to doggedly protect their interests.

 This decision will no doubt leave the proposed charitable intervenors a bit dog-eared. But it appropriately — and thankfully (I’m all out of dog puns) — brings closure to a nearly 25-year-old saga (in dog years, of course: http://www.onlineconversion.com/dogyears.htm).

The recent entry by Jaclene D’Agostino addressed the issue of constructive trusts. From that, we learned that a constructive trust is characterized by four elements: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relationship; (2) a promise; (3) a transfer in reliance thereon; and (4) unjust enrichment. While not an express trust in kind, a constructive trust is an equally useful device created by operation of law in order to promote equity. Although the Court of Appeals in Latham v. Father Devine, 299 NY 22 (1949) and Matter of O’Hara’s Will, 95 NY 403 (1884), cited by Ms. D’Agostino in her article, imposed a constructive trust under the circumstances presented, the Surrogate’s Court, Suffolk County in Dext v. Rorech III, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of William Rorech, Jr., NYLJ, 2/18/11, p.33 (col. 5) rejected that result for reasons explained below.

Before the court in Dext was a motion for summary judgment brought by the fiduciary in an action concerning the parties’ rights with respect to the decedent’s realty. The decedent’s Will was admitted to probate in Florida, and his son was appointed fiduciary of his estate. Thereafter, the fiduciary was appointed ancillary executor of the decedent’s estate in order to pursue an eviction in connection with the decedent’s home in Smithtown. The fiduciary alleged that the resident at the premises had been residing there rent-free for over a year since the decedent’s death.

Subsequently, the resident instituted an action, as plaintiff, in Supreme Court against the fiduciary alleging, inter alia, a cause of action in constructive trust, and requesting that she be given a life estate in the property. An answer was filed, and the fiduciary then moved for summary relief alleging, inter alia, that the decedent was the sole owner of the property, that there was no provision in the Will for plaintiff, that there was no written instrument evidencing the plaintiff’s right to occupy the premises, and that there was no proof of the promise(s) alleged. In opposition to the motion, plaintiff maintained that there were triable issues of fact as to whether the decedent had made an oral promise to plaintiff of a life estate in the premises, and, that there was part performance of same when decedent had plaintiff relocate from her home in Montauk to the Smithtown property. Further, plaintiff submitted her signed affidavit to support her claims, naming a number of witnesses who would testify on her behalf. The fiduciary replied.

 In the interim, the action was transferred to the Surrogate’s Court pursuant to a so-ordered stipulation of the parties.

In granting the fiduciary’s motion for summary judgment, the court opined that in order to establish a claim for constructive trust four elements must be proven: 1) a confidential or fiduciary relationship between the parties; 2) a promise; 3) a transfer in reliance on the promise, and 4) unjust enrichment. Although the court noted that plaintiff had a close, confidential relationship with the decedent, it found that plaintiff had failed to prove the other required elements of a constructive trust.

Significantly, the court found that plaintiff would be the primary witness in support of her claim, inasmuch as she failed to oppose the defendant fiduciary’s contention that these witnesses expressed no knowledge of the purported promise to plaintiff by the decedent. Further, the court noted that although plaintiff alleged that she had other witnesses to testify on her behalf, she failed to offer any proof regarding these witnesses other than her own self-serving affidavit. Additionally, the court opined that plaintiff’s contention that she gave up her home in Montauk based upon the decedent’s alleged promise was insufficient to demonstrate a transfer in reliance or unjust enrichment.

 Finally, the court held that plaintiff’s theory based upon part performance of an oral contract to give plaintiff a life estate also failed, on the grounds that her move from her Montauk home could not reasonably be viewed as unequivocally referable to the alleged agreement she had with the decedent.

Hence, it can be seen from the foregoing, that while a cause of action based in constructive trust may be a useful tool in obtaining equitable relief, the failure to prove the requisite elements thereof can prove fatal in some circumstances.

Most simply explained, a constructive trust is an equitable remedy imposed to prevent unjust enrichment (see Simonds v Simonds, 45 NY2d 233, 242 [1978]; Sharp v Kosmalski, 40 NY2d 119 [1976]). According to the Court of Appeals, the constructive trust is “the formula through which the conscience of equity finds expression. Where property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee” (Beatty v Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 NY 380, 386 [1919]). 

It is an amorphous doctrine, as the constructive trust is “not limited by rigid definition and its very purpose requires flexibility in its application” (In re Alpert, 9 Misc 3d 1102[A], *10). It therefore follows that the constructive trust “has been famously described as a remedy applicable to ‘whatever knavery human ingenuity can invent’” (In re Alpert, 9 Misc 3d at *7 [Sur Ct, New York County 2005], quoting Bogert, Trusts and Trustees Sec. 471 at 29 [2d ed rev]). In fact, it is of such broad scope that attempted precise definitions have been deemed inadequate (see Simonds v Simonds, 45 NY2d 233, 241 [1978]).

 

Even applicable in the case of an innocent donee, no wrongful act is necessary to find unjust enrichment warranting the imposition of a constructive trust. However, in the case of a bona fide purchaser, he or she takes property free of a constructive trust that would otherwise be imposed (5 Scott, Trusts [3d ed] sec.468).

 

A constructive trust “is perhaps more different from an express trust than it is similar”, in that “the constructive trustee is not compelled to convey the property because he is a constructive trustee; it is because he can be compelled to convey that he is a constructive trustee” (Simonds v Simonds, 45 NY2d 233, 241 [1978], relying on 5 Scott, Trusts [3d ed], sec. 461-462]). Generally, the following elements must be established to state a claim for this type of relief: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relation; (2) a promise; (3) a transfer in reliance thereon; and (4) unjust enrichment (see Sharp v Kosmalski, 40 NY2d 119, 121 [1976]). Nonetheless, unlike most causes of action, courts do not require strict satisfaction of each element, but rather use them more as flexible considerations (Lester v Zimmer, 147 AD2d 340, 341 [3d Dept 1989]). 

           

Courts most often impose constructive trusts where traditional remedies prove inadequate or unavailable.   Perhaps most illustrative in the context of trusts and estates is the landmark case of Latham v Father Divine, 299 NY 22 (1949), where the facts seemed appropriate for a claim for tortious interference with wills, a cause of action that is not recognized by New York law (see Restatement (Second) of Torts §774B [1979-2010], citing Vogt v Witmeyer, 87 NY2d 998, 999 [1996]). 

 

In Latham, the decedent had executed a will, but later expressed a desire to create a new testamentary instrument to contain bequests to other individuals.  However, due to fraud, undue influence, and ultimately murder committed by the defendant, the decedent was prevented from executing her new will.

 

As is often the case where a constructive trust proves to be the appropriate remedy, the Court of Appeals recognized that there was no precedent precisely on point to address the facts presented. But the Court relied upon other well-respected authorities and explained that “[w]here a devisee or legatee under a will already executed prevents the testator by fraud, duress or undue influence from revoking the will and executing a new will in favor of another or from making a codicil, so that the testator dies leaving the original will in force, the devisee or legatee holds the property thus acquired upon a constructive trust for the intended devisee or legatee” (Latham v Father Divine, 299 NY 22 , 26 [1949]).

 

In light of that rule, along with other analogous Court of Appeals decisions, the Court held that the imposition of a constructive trust was appropriate, as “its applicability is limited only by the inventiveness of men who find new ways to enrich themselves unjustly by grasping what should not belong to them” (299 NY at 27). The Court further stated that “a constructive trust will be erected whenever necessary to satisfy the demands of justice” (see id.). 

 

In coming to its conclusion, the Court cited Matter of O’Hara’s Will, 95 NY 403 (1884), noting that the plaintiffs in that case successfully obtained a constructive trust in their favor, notwithstanding the fact that “disappointed hopes and unrealized expectations were all that the secretly intended beneficiaries, not named in the will, had,” as well as Williams v Fitch, 18 NY 546 (1859), in which the fraud “consisted of the legatee’s failure or refusal to carry out the testator’s designs, after tacitly or expressly promising so to do” (see Latham, 299 NY at 27).   Notably, in Latham, there was no discussion of a fiduciary or confidential relationship, one of the elements generally considered in determining the appropriateness of imposing a constructive trust.

 

In sum, the constructive trust is a remedy that may be applied in a variety of situations where equity demands, despite the feasibility of strictly satisfying its elements, and should be kept in mind as a potential claim to correct a wrong that may not fit squarely within any other cause of action.

           

A notable decision has been rendered by the Second Department, dismissing a trust rescission action as a result of Plaintiff’s failure to join certain remainderpersons and charitable beneficiaries as parties.

In Estate of Nowitz v. Nowtiz, 2009 NY Slip Op 06660 (2d Dept 2009), the Decedent had commenced an action during his lifetime to rescind an irrevocable trust agreement without the consent of the trustee. After a jury trial entering a judgment in favor of the Plaintiff’s Decedent, the Defendant appealed seeking a dismissal for failure to join necessary parties and the expiration of the statute of limitations. The Second Department remitted the case to the Supreme Court for a determination (see Estate of Nowitz v. Nowtiz, 37 AD3d 788 [2d Dept 2007]).

According to the lower court, one of the remainderpersons and two of the charitable beneficiaries had waived any appearance on the matter. It further opined that plaintiff’s failure to join the remaining four beneficiaries was excusable due to their notice of the action before it proceeded to trial, and failure to intervene (Estate of Nowitz v. Nowtiz, 2009 NY Slip Op 066600 [2d Dept 2009]).

Relying on CPLR 1001(b), the Appellate Division reversed. It explained that according to statute, courts may excuse failure to join a necessary party upon consideration of five factors:

·        Whether there exists another remedy for the petitioner if the action is dismissed due to nonjoinder;

·        The prejudice to the party who has not been joined;

·        Whether and by whom prejudice may have been, or may in the future be, avoided;

·        Whether a protective provision in the judgment is feasible; and

·        Whether an effective judgment may be rendered in the absence of the party that was not joined (see CPLR 1001[b]).

Although the Court recognized that the first factor was in favor of excusing the nonjoinder because the plaintiff had no other effective remedy, it determined that a consideration of the remaining factors weighed against proceeding in the absence of the beneficiaries that had not been joined (Estate of Nowitz v. Nowtiz, 2009 NY Slip Op 066600). 

Specifically, in light of the second and third factors, the Court held that the beneficiaries would be greatly prejudiced if the trust were rescinded without their participation in the action, and that the plaintiff could have avoided prejudice to the beneficiaries by timely joining them as defendants. The Appellate Division rejected the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the nonjoinder was excusable because the beneficiaries could have avoided any prejudice by seeking to interve; instead holding that this fact was outweighed by the absence of a reasonable excuse for failure to join (id.).  

In contemplating the forth CPLR 1001(b) factor, the Court opined that the facts were not in favor of proceeding in the absence of beneficiaries; a protective provision in an ultimate judgment was not feasible because rescission of the trust would directly affect their economic interests. Finally, the Court held that the efficacy of a judgment would be questionable without the participation of the beneficiaries who had not been joined, thus rendering the fifth factor against nonjoinder as well (id.).

Because four of the five CPLR 1001(b) factors weighed against proceeding without those who had not been joined in the action, the Appellate Division held that these beneficiaries were indispensible parties. Coupling this with the fact that the applicable statute of limitations had expired, the Court dismissed the action (id.).

 

The foregoing serves as a caveat to trust and estate litigators, emphasizing the importance of joining all beneficiaries in a proceeding. Although dismissal is never desirable for the petitioner or plaintiff, a dismissal predicated on failure to join an indispensible party is especially unpleasant considering the ease of avoiding such a result. Indeed, where the CPLR 1001(b) factors render a party to be necessary, a beneficiary’s failure to intervene upon notice of the proceeding is no excuse. Inclusion of all indispensable parties is the responsibility of the party commencing the action. 

In terrorem provisions, which are more commonly known as “no contest” clauses, generally state that beneficiaries forfeit their interests in estates and trusts by contesting the validity of the governing instruments (see Matter of Kalikow, 23 Misc3d 1107[A], at *2 [Sur Ct, Nassau County 2009] [discussing in terrorem clauses]). While strictly construed, such clauses are enforceable in New York (Matter of Ellis, 252 AD2d 118, 127-28 [2d Dept 1998]). They serve several important purposes, such as preventing challenges to wills which might result in trials, jeopardize the testator or grantor’s testamentary or inter vivos plans, or harass other beneficiaries (Matter of Singer, 17 Misc3d 365, 370 [Sur Ct, Kings County], aff’d, 52 AD3d 612 [2d Dept 2008], leave granted, 11 NY3d 716 [2009]; Tumminello v Bolten, 59 AD3d 727, 728 [2d Dept 2009]). 

In Shamash v Stark, Surrogate Kristin Booth Glen of the Surrogate’s Court, New York County, recently addressed an issue of first impression in New York (Shamash v Stark, NYLJ, 6/16/2009, at 38, col. 2 [Sur Ct, New York County]). The issue was whether will and trust contests in Florida, where no contest clauses are void as against public policy (F.S.A. § 732.517), triggered an in terrorem clause contained in a New York trust instrument (Shamash, supra).[1] 
 

In Shamash, the decedent’s revocable trust, which was governed by New York law, provided that any beneficiary who contested his will or trust would forfeit his or her interest in the trust (id.).  After contesting the will and trust in Florida, the petitioner commenced an accounting and removal proceeding with respect to the trust in the New York Surrogate’s Court (id.). The respondents moved to dismiss the Surrogate’s Court proceeding, arguing that the petitioner was not a beneficiary of the trust estate, and therefore lacked standing to maintain the proceeding, because he had triggered the trust’s in terrorem clause by contesting the will and trust in Florida (id.). In opposition, the petitioner asserted, among other things, that he did not trigger the in terrorem clause because no contest clauses are void under Florida law (id.).

 

The Surrogate’s Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner lacked standing to seek an accounting or removal with respect to the trust (id.). The court reasoned that: (1) the trust is governed by New York law; (2) in terrorem clauses are enforceable in New York; and (3) the petitioner triggered the trust’s in terrorem clause by contesting the decedent’s will and trust in Florida (id.). The fact that no contest clauses are void as against public policy in Florida was immaterial (id.).

           

The lesson to take away from Shamash is that the contest of a will or trust in another state, where in terrorem clauses are not enforceable, may trigger such a clause in a New York instrument and result in the forfeiture of a beneficiary’s interest in the subject estate or trust.

 

 

[1]   This firm represented the respondents in the Surrogate’s Court proceeding.