As the year draws to a close, I sometimes recall the stresses of final exam season from my law school days. In the spirit of reminiscence, I’ll pose a quick final-exam-like fact pattern:

Jane owned a parcel of real property in New Hyde Park, title to which she transferred in June 2002 to her irrevocable lifetime trust. Jane listed the New Hyde Park property on Schedule A to the trust agreement, and also executed and recorded a deed transferring the property to her trustees. The trust agreement provides that upon Jane’s death, the remaining corpus of the trust is to be divided among her two children, Nancy and Thomas, in equal shares per stirpes. Nancy and Thomas are specifically named as remainder beneficiaries under the trust agreement.

In February 2013, Thomas predeceased Jane, leaving no spouse or issue, and having no will.

In January 2014, Jane created a will which included a general bequest of all of her real property and her residuary estate to her three grandchildren, Scott, John and Jessica, the children of Nancy.

Jane died in July 2014. At Jane’s death, her irrevocable trust was still in existence and the deed to the New Hyde Park property was still in the name of the trustees of Jane’s trust. Scott sought admission of Jane’s January 2014 will to probate and received preliminary letters testamentary. Assuming admission of Jane’s January 2014 will to probate, who will receive title to the New Hyde Park property?

If you want to cheat, the answer can be found in a recent Nassau County Surrogate’s Court decision, Matter of Wilder (NYLJ, September 3, 2015, p.25, col.6). The crux of the dispute decided by Surrogate McCarty was that both Nancy, as trustee and beneficiary of Jane’s irrevocable trust, and Scott, as preliminary executor and a legatee of Jane’s estate, claimed an interest in the New Hyde Park property.

Nancy asserted that the property was owned solely by the trust and should pass 100% to her. As the trust distribution is to be per stirpes, she referred to EPTL 1-2.14, which provides:

“The property so passing is divided into as many equal shares as there are (i) surviving issue in the generation nearest to the deceased ancestor which contains one or more surviving issue and (ii) deceased issue in the same generation who left surviving issue, if any. Each surviving member in such nearest generation is allocated one share.”

Nancy claimed that the per stirpetal division and distribution should be made at her generation level, as it was the nearest to Jane and contained both surviving and deceased members. Since Thomas did not leave issue, Nancy argued only one share should be created, passing entirely to her as the sole surviving trust beneficiary.

Conversely, Scott asserted that 50% of the New Hyde Park property was owned by Jane at her death and should pass to her grandchildren pursuant to her January 2014 will. Scott claimed that because the trust was irrevocable and the remainder over to Nancy and Thomas was not conditioned upon their survival, a 50% interest in the New Hyde Park property vested immediately and absolutely in Thomas upon transfer of the real property to the trust. When Thomas died, his estate owned that 50% real property interest and it ultimately passed by intestacy to his sole intestate distributee, his mother Jane. Thus, Scott argued, when Jane bequeathed her real estate by her will, this 50% interest in the New Hyde Park property passed to her grandchildren.

Who was right? Neither, party entirely. As with many final exam questions, the fight over interests in the New Hyde Park property was a red herring. The Surrogate clarified that the dispute at issue was properly over a 50% remainder interest in Jane’s trust, not a 50% interest in the New Hyde Park property. Whether Thomas had any interest when he died, it would only have been an interest in the remaining trust property, not the New Hyde Park property transferred to the trust. For example, the New Hyde Park property could have been sold by the trustee and neither Thomas, nor his estate, would have standing to prevent that.

But the question still remained whether Thomas had any remainder interest in Jane’s trust even though he predeceased Jane. Surrogate McCarty noted EPTL 2-1.15 which provides that when the remainder of a trust passes to two or more designated beneficiaries and such remainder provision is ineffective in part, without an alternative disposition, the ineffective portion passes to the remaining designated beneficiaries. Thus, if the trust remainder provision was ineffective as to Thomas, due to his predeceasing Jane, the trust remainder would pass entirely to Nancy as the sole remaining beneficiary. If, however, the trust remainder portion for Thomas vested both immediately and indefeasibly, the trust remainder provision would have been effective despite Thomas’ death, and EPTL 2-1.15 would not apply.

The Surrogate next determined that Thomas’ remainder interest in the trust vested immediately upon the trust’s creation because Thomas was specifically named, and this creates a strong inference of vesting. As for whether the vesting was indefeasible, the words “per stirpes” created a potential condition for defeasance of Thomas’ vested interest, because they indicated Jane’s intent that Thomas’ death might lead to his issue taking his previously vested share. Thus Thomas’ lack of issue became the deciding factor.

The Surrogate rejected Nancy’s interpretation of the per stirpes provision under EPTL 1-2.14. The term per stirpes provides for division among a class of persons, and it is not possible to make a per stirpetal ‘division’ among one person. If Thomas had died with issue, then a class would have existed and a per stirpetal division could have been made. Since Thomas had no issue, the per stirpes provision is not operative. Moreover, the “per stirpes” qualification language in the trust agreement meant that Thomas’ vested interest would only be defeated if Thomas both (1) died before Jane, and (2) died leaving issue surviving him. Since both conditions were not satisfied, Thomas’ previously vested interest in the trust remainder was not defeated by his death. As a result, Thomas’ estate would be entitled to a 50% remainder interest in the trust, which would pass to Jane by intestacy and be disposed of by her will.

How did you score on the exam? More importantly, perhaps, despite the legal logic of the result, do you think this is the result Jane intended? Jane’s property ultimately remained in her family, but would your answer to that final question have been different if Thomas had made a will giving his property to a non-family member? As with most exam-type fact patterns, careful trust drafting could have prevented the dispute.

A donor writes in a pledge amount, signs the pledge card, hands it over to the charity, and is absolutely committed to that amount; end of story, right?  Not necessarily.  A recent case emanating from Kings County Surrogate’s Court, Matter of Kramer, N.Y.L.J. April 21, 2014, p. 24 (col. 6), shows that certain charitable pledges may not be as binding as they appear on paper.  The case provides an excellent primer on the operation of specific charitable pledges under the theory of unilateral contracts, and serves as a stark reminder to charities that to have the right to enforce a pledge that they must do more than just secure a signature on a pledge card.  The case also underscores to estate administrators the importance of scrutinizing and potentially challenging seemingly credible claims against an estate.

Kramer involved a motion by a charity, Educational Institute Oholei Torah-Oholei Menachem, for summary judgment dismissing objections to its petition to determine the validity and enforceability of its claim against the estate of Isaac Kramer.  The charity’s claim was based upon a pledge card and promissory note, in the face amount of $1,800,000, allegedly signed by the decedent approximately a year and a half before his death, and ostensibly payable six months prior to the decedent’s death.  The pledge was allegedly given for the purpose of supporting a building campaign proposed by the charity to construct a new ritualarium, or mikveh, for use of the charity’s members.  No payment on the pledge had been made by the decedent or demanded by the charity prior to the decedent’s death.  Representatives of the charity claimed they consciously withheld demands for payment because of the decedent’s illness shortly before his death.

Objections to the charity’s petition were filed by each of the Kings County Public Administrator, as fiduciary of the decedent’s estate, and four additional groups representing various purported testamentary legatees and distributees.  The respective objections raised multiple theories for rejection of, and affirmative defenses against, the charity’s claim including (i) forgery of the decedent’s signature, (ii) lack of due execution, (iii) lack of consideration, (iv) lapse upon the decedent’s death, (v) laches and unclean hands, (vi) expiration of the statute of limitations, (vii) fraudulent inducement, and (viii) the decedent’s lack of capacity.  Upon the charity’s summary judgment motion, two of the respondents cross moved for summary judgment upon an additional theory of the charity’s failure to demonstrate acceptance of the pledge by taking action in reliance thereon.

The Court granted the charity’s motion for summary judgment concerning the objections based upon lack of due execution, laches, unclean hands, expiration of the statute of limitations, and fraudulent inducement, because none of the respondents supported or addressed these objections in their responsive papers.  Thus, these objections were deemed abandoned.  The Court also found that no triable issue of fact was raised concerning the decedent’s capacity, and that the burden of proving the decedent’s incompetence was not met.  Accordingly, the charity’s motion for summary judgment was granted concerning the objections based upon capacity.  The charity also prevailed concerning objections based upon forgery of the decedent’s signature, as the Court found that the handwriting analysis report raised no triable issue of fact concerning its genuineness.

The final objection considered by the Court, lack of consideration, however, turned out to be dispositive against the charity.  It was clear from the facts and on the face of the pledge that it was made in furtherance of a specific purpose, namely a building project, rather than for the charity’s general educational and religious work.  As such, the Court noted that the pledge must be examined under the theory of a unilateral contract.  Under this theory, the signed pledge card is not the contract itself, but merely an offer to make a contract which the charity must then accept by taking action in reliance upon the offer.  The pledge, then, will not become binding until the charity has sufficiently acted upon the pledge so as to incur liability on the part of the donor. 

The Court stated that it has been the “noted policy of the courts to sustain the validity of subscription agreements whenever a counter promise of the donee can be sustained from the actions of the parties or it can be demonstrated that any legal detriment has been sustained by the promise in reliance upon the promised gift.”  For instance, charitable subscriptions have been deemed enforceable where the donee has made some substantive progress towards the charitable goal for which the pledge was made.  This would include starting construction, employing architects and paying for plans, raising additional pledges based upon the disputed pledge, or taking on a construction loan for the project.  The donor’s partial payment of the pledge, whether alone or in conjunction with concrete action on the part of the charity, has also been deemed sufficient to indicate acceptance of the unilateral contract.

Despite this broad policy in favor of enforcement, the charity in Kramer was unable to meet the burden to show that it had meaningfully acted in reliance upon the pledge.  Indeed, it was undisputed that no actual construction had begun on the proposed building project.  Nor was there any specific date upon which construction was to begin, or any reasonable timeframe for completion of the project.  The Court characterized the construction project as more of a “hoped-for occurrence” than an actual plan.  Moreover, despite its claims to the contrary, the charity could not prove that it had expended any sums of money on any construction related expenses, such as soil samples or architectural plans.  Nor could the charity produce any contracts or engagement letters from architects, engineers, or contractors.  There was also no proof of building permit or zoning applications.  Finally, though the charity claimed to have used the decedent’s pledge to solicit other pledges, no independent evidence of receipt or fulfillment of such additional pledges was offered.  In sum, the Court found that the charity had done nothing meaningful or substantive in reliance on the decedent’s pledge.  Thus, the charity’s motion for summary judgment on the consideration issue was denied and the cross-motions dismissing the charity’s petition were granted.

 The Kramer case should serve as a useful guide for charities in satisfying the requirements for establishing enforceability of specific charitable pledges.  It also gives estate administrators helpful factors to look for when challenging charitable pledges

Most estate attorneys are familiar with the concept of the so-called “slayer rule” whereby a person responsible for the murder of an individual cannot benefit from the murdered individual’s estate. This rule has its genesis in the Court of Appeals decision of Riggs v Palmer, in which the Court stated “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime” (Riggs v Palmer, 115 NY 506, 511 [1889]).

Though this equitable rule would appear to be relatively unambiguous in application, questions of its interpretation arise from time to time in the Surrogate’s Courts. Previous entries on this blog have discussed the Suffolk County Surrogate’s Court’s decision to expand the rule by barring a murderer from benefitting not only from his victim’s estate but also the estate of a post-deceased legatee of the victim. 

In an upcoming Nassau County Surrogate’s Court hearing, Surrogate McCarty, on the other hand, will be tasked with assessing the possible boundaries of the slayer rule vis a vis the insanity defense. The hearing, scheduled for August 15, 2013, concerns the case of Leatrice Brewer who in 2008 drowned her three children in a bathtub (see Newsday July 12, 2013). Ms. Brewer admitted to killing her children and in 2010 entered a plea of “not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect” in her criminal proceeding. Thereafter, Innocent Demesyeux, the father of two of the deceased children, received limited letters of administration concerning his children’s estates and sued Nassau County for wrongful death. The suit settled for $250,000 and the father petitioned the Nassau County Surrogate’s Court to compromise the wrongful death action and settle his account. As part of his petition, Mr. Demesyeux has requested that Ms. Brewer be held to have forfeited any interest in her children’s estates by virtue of the slayer rule. The hearing this month will determine this request. 

In a recent pre-hearing decision concerning access to Ms. Brewer’s court files, Surrogate McCarty addressed and previewed some of the issues that will likely be argued in the upcoming hearing (see Matter of Demesyeux, 350391/A, NYLJ 1202598464881, at *1 [Sur Ct, Nassau County, Decided March 29, 2013]). In order to respond to Mr. Demesyeux’s petition, the guardian ad litem assigned to represent Ms. Brewer’s interests in the proceeding attempted to view Ms. Brewer’s Family Court and criminal proceeding records but was told such records were sealed. The guardian ad litem thereafter filed a report in Surrogate’s Court seeking a court-order to unseal the records.

In his decision concerning the guardian ad litem’s request, Surrogate McCarty surveyed the history of the slayer rule under Riggs and its progeny noting that, though there is no express statutory statement of the rule, “numerous cases since Riggs v. Palmer have reaffirmed the applicability of the common-law general principle that one should not be permitted to profit by taking the life of another and, in particular, that one who feloniously murders shall not be entitled to share in his victim’s estate” (Matter of Demesyeux at 2). Conversely, the Surrogate noted that application of the rule is not always straightforward and “there is some authority that if the killing was unintentional or accidental, the rule will not be applied” (id. at 3). For instance, the Surrogate cited Matter of Eckhardt (184 Misc 748 [Sur Ct, Orange County 1945]) concerning a somnambulist who killed her husband but was found not to have known the nature and quality of her act.

In connection with the guardian ad litem’s request to view Ms. Brewer’s criminal court files, the Surrogate considered the application of CPL §160.50, which requires that records be sealed if a criminal action is terminated in favor of the accused, ostensibly to spare the accused the social stigma of a criminal prosecution. The question, according to the Surrogate, is whether a termination by reason of an insanity plea can be construed as ‘favorable’ to the accused. Surrogate McCarty quoted the decision of Matter of Anonymous (174 Misc 2d 333 [Sup Ct, Kings County 1997]), which described persons acquitted of a crime via the insanity defense as occupying a special class. Such persons have been proven or have admitted to performance of criminal acts that would ordinarily be subject to punishment. Nevertheless, due to “society’s compassionate belief” that persons with mental defects not be criminally punished, they are spared the penalization they would otherwise justifiably receive. Then again, because they have undisputedly committed criminal acts and are dangers to society, such persons, while spared incarceration, are held in state custody. Balancing the policy considerations of the insanity defense, the court in Anonymous ruled that persons acquitted by reason of an insanity defense have not had their case terminated in their favor. Surrogate McCarty agreed, opining that Ms. Brewer’s criminal records should not be sealed.

No doubt, the upcoming hearing will involve a similar balancing of the equities and policies behind the slayer rule against those behind the insanity defense. Based upon the cases quoted by the Surrogate in Matter of Demesyeux, it appears that the parties will focus on whether or not Ms. Brewer acted with intent and knew the nature of her act. I do not envy the difficult decision Surrogate McCarty will have to make in looking beyond the strong emotional underpinnings of this case. 

Can a surviving spouse be guilty of abandonment, consequently forfeiting the presumptive right to administer her deceased spouse’s estate, if she was effectively in a “marriage of convenience”? In her recent decision in Estate of Shoichiro Hama, 2009-4505 NYLJ 1202579753326, at *1 (Sur Ct, New York County, Decided November 26, 2012) former New York County Surrogate Glen decided in the affirmative. In considering the issue of abandonment, the Surrogate also called for a general re-examination of the concept of a ‘surviving spouse’ as it pertains to intestate succession and other spousal rights under the EPTL.

The problematic facts of the case may have spurred Surrogate Glen’s more general contemplations. It is relatively clear from the court’s decision that the decedent married the spouse primarily for tax reasons and, during the marriage, the spouse lived with another man, publicly holding herself out to be married to this second man, with the decedent’s knowledge and consent.

Shoichiro Hama, the decedent, owned a condominium apartment in Manhattan and sought to sell it. In June 2006, he consulted his accountant who informed the decedent that he would incur significant capital gains taxes on the sale. When the decedent inquired how he could mitigate these taxes, the accountant joked that he could get married. A few weeks following this discussion, on July 7, 2006, the decedent married Yuko Machida, an employee of his company. Two months thereafter, on September 6, 2006, the decedent sold his apartment. In November 2006, the decedent told his accountant that he wished to obtain a divorce and the accountant advised against it. The decedent asked how long the accountant recommended he stay married to preserve his tax benefit, and the accountant advised two years.

In 2007, the decedent moved to Japan and Machida also moved to Japan, but to live with another man, Travis Klose, with whom she had maintained a relationship prior to her marriage to the decedent. Facing parental stigma for living with a man with whom she was not married, Machida registered in Japan as being married to Klose. The decedent was aware of this and, in fact, assisted in Machida’s registration as Klose’s wife by signing and affixing his personal seal to their marriage certificate, as a witness.

In August 2009, the decedent inquired of his accountant whether he could then divorce Machida. As the decedent was contemplating the sale of another apartment in Manhattan, the accountant advised him that he should remain married. The decedent subsequently died intestate on September 4, 2009. Thereafter, Machida petitioned for issuance of letters of administration, via a designee, and the decedent’s parents cross petitioned for the same, via a designee. Temporary Letters of Administration issued to Machida’s designee. The designee of the decedent’s parents filed a motion for, among other things, summary judgment revoking Machida’s designee’s letters, and dismissing Machida’s administration petition, based on a claim of spousal abandonment.

EPTL 5-1.2 (a)(5) provides that a husband or wife is disqualified as a surviving spouse under the EPTL, for purposes of intestate distribution, among other things, if it is established that the husband or wife abandoned the deceased spouse and such abandonment continued until the time of death. Former Surrogate Glen noted that while the EPTL contains no definition of abandonment, it is generally and historically understood that the concept was imported from the Domestic Relations Law, such that if a spouse would have been entitled to a decree of divorce based on the grounds of abandonment, such spouse would be subject to a viable claim of abandonment under the EPTL.

The long-standing Court of Appeals decision in Matter of Maiden (284 NY 429 [1940]), holds that to constitute abandonment, a spouse’s departure from the marital home must be both “unjustified and without the consent of the other spouse” (id. at 432). As Surrogate Glen noted, the decedent’s participation in Machida’s ‘marriage’ to Klose in Japan was “the very opposite of ‘lack of consent’” and the decedent’s parents’ claim of abandonment would fail under this test (Estate of Shoichiro Hama at *7).

Nevertheless, Surrogate Glen based her decision on another case, Matter of Oswald (43 Misc 2d 774 [Sur Ct, Nassau County 1964], affd 24 AD2d 465 [2d Dept 1965], affd 17 NY2d 447 [1965]). In that case, the parties allegedly entered into a common law marriage, but later exchanged mutual releases and each married another. The Surrogate found abandonment, quoting Matter of Bingham (178 Misc 801 [Sur Ct, Kings County 1942], affd 265 AD 463 [2d Dept 1943], rearg denied and lv denied 266 AD 669 [2d Dept 1943]), that “[t]he court knows of no more convincing evidence of abandonment than the public ceremonial remarriage of the petitioner to another woman in the lifetime of the decedent and his cohabitation with such woman as husband and wife” (id. at 805). The Appellate Division affirmed Oswald “on the opinion of the Surrogate” and the Court of Appeals affirmed without decision. Thus, it is not clear whether public remarriage, valid or not, qualifies as abandonment and stands as an exception to the Maiden requirement that abandonment be without consent. Based on the ambiguity created by the Court of Appeals’ affirmation of Oswald, in seeming conflict with its earlier rule in Maiden, Surrogate Glen ultimately held for the decedent’s parents and found abandonment by Machida.

This holding lead Surrogate Glen to question general policy issues regarding surviving spouses. First and foremost, Surrogate Glen noted that New York has done away with the fault-based divorce system from which the concept of abandonment first sprung. She then traced the historical evolution and reappraisals of spousal relationships under New York’s divorce law. One of the primary factors in this evolution, she noted, has been the shift in the understanding of marriage from being a sacred bond for life to being an economic partnership. She called for a similar reappraisal in estate law.

The concept of a surviving spouse, according to the Surrogate, was originally used as a proxy for the person closest to and/or most dependent on the deceased spouse, that is, the natural object of the deceased spouse’s bounty. Thus a surviving spouse has priority to administer an estate, priority of intestate distribution, and the right to elect against an estate. But what of spouses who remain married but live apart for years? What of married partners who develop fulfilling and committed relationships with other persons, without formally divorcing their spouse? Who is the more natural object of bounty in this case? According to Surrogate Glen, the current estate concept of a surviving spouse “no longer reflects reality, at least for a large number of people.” She concluded that “[c]hanging understandings of what constitutes family, demographic shifts, and alterations in economic dependence strongly suggest the need both to reappraise the spousal disqualification statute and the interests it serves: administration, intestacy and spousal election. One may hope that the bar and the legislature will hear and heed this call” (Estate of Shoichiro Hama at *16-*17).

In light of the radically changing societal and legal conceptions of marriage, does the current standard of spousal abandonment, which is itself grounded in a fault-based divorce system that, for the most part, no longer exists, continue to serve the purposes for which it was intended or the premises on which it was based? It remains to be seen whether the legislature will consider or address Surrogate Glen’s thought-provoking questions.

 

 

 Estate planning attorneys who prepare durable New York powers of attorney for their clients often counsel them to exercise care in allowing the use of such instruments because they grant the attorney-in-fact broad and sweeping authority. As a shorthand way of describing a power of attorney, an estate planner might tell a client that it allows the attorney-in-fact to do pretty much anything the client could do. The recent Appellate Division decision in Matter of Perosi v. LiGreci  illustrates the accuracy of this shorthand description. In that case, the court held that the authority granted to an attorney-in-fact under a New York statutory power of attorney includes the power to amend an irrevocable trust with the consent of the beneficiaries, pursuant to EPTL 7-1.9.

In 1991, Nicholas LiGreci created an irrevocable trust for the benefit of his three children, including his daughter Linda. Nicholas named his brother, John LiGreci, as the trustee. On April 20, 2010, Nicholas executed a durable New York statutory short-form power of attorney naming his daughter Linda as his attorney-in-fact. The power of attorney included authorization for “estate transactions,” as construed under GOL § 5-1502G and “all other matters,” as construed under GOL § 5-1502N. Nicholas also signed a major gifts rider. 

One month after the power of attorney was created, Linda, as attorney-in-fact for Nicholas LiGreci, executed an amendment to the irrevocable trust naming her son, Nicholas Perosi, as trustee instead of her uncle, John LiGreci. New York EPTL 7-1.9 allows the creator of a trust to “revoke or amend the whole or any part thereof” by an acknowledged instrument and with the written consent of all the trust beneficiaries. Pursuant to EPTL 7-1.9, each of the beneficiaries of the irrevocable trust consented to the amendment. John LiGreci did not consent to the amendment, nor was his consent required, as he was not a beneficiary.

Nicholas LiGreci passed away on June 3, 2010, never having personally signed the trust amendment. On July 28, 2010, Linda and her son, Nicholas Perosi, as the successor trustee, petitioned for an accounting from John LiGreci; for the removal of John LiGreci as trustee; and for turnover of the trust assets and records to Nicholas Perosi. John LiGreci moved to set aside the trust amendment, arguing that the trust was irrevocable and Linda did not have authority under the power of attorney to amend the trust. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that a power of attorney is a “forward looking” instrument and does not grant an attorney-in-fact authority to amend estate planning devices created prior to the execution of a power of attorney. The Supreme Court also found that the right to amend or revoke an irrevocable trust is a right that is personal to the creator and cannot be exercised by an agent unless the power of attorney expressly provides.

On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed (Matter of Perosi v. LiGreci, 2012 NY Slip Op 05533, decided July 11, 2012). Justice John Leventhal, in opinion joined by Justices Skelos, Balkin and Lott, explained that the irrevocable trust agreement did not specify any procedure by which the trust could be amended, and therefore EPTL 7-1.9 is applicable and allowed Nicholas LiGreci to amend the trust with the consent of the beneficiaries. Examining the power of attorney granted to Linda, the court quoted Zaubler v Picone, 100 AD2d 620, 621 (2d Dept 1984), in which it stated that “[a]n attorney in fact is essentially an alter ego of the principal and is authorized to act with respect to any and all matters on behalf of the principal with the exception of those acts which, by their nature, by public policy, or by contract require personal performance.” The court listed the “few exceptions” to the powers granted to an attorney-in-fact: the execution of a principal’s will, the execution of a principal’s affidavit upon personal knowledge, and the entrance into a principal’s marriage or divorce. Amending or revoking a trust with the consent of the beneficiaries, on the other hand, was not found to be an act which requires personal performance of a principal. The court, therefore, held that Linda, as attorney-in-fact and alter ego of Nicholas LiGreci, properly amended the irrevocable trust.

The court acknowledged that there may be policy considerations for prohibiting an attorney-in-fact from amending or revoking an irrevocable trust “based upon the premise that a creator knows what is best for his or her trust and overall estate plan.”  It concluded, however, that “such a policy is for the Legislature to enact, not the courts.”