In the past, New York Courts have demonstrated a willingness to apply the theory of promissory estoppel, to overcome the legal requirements of the Statute of Frauds. The Restatement (Second) of Contract, Section 139, endorses this principle, providing:
“A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce the action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise”
However, a recent decision from the New York Court of Appeals, limited the purview of applying the theory to overcome the statutory requirements of the Statute of Frauds.
In the Matter of Hennel, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, reversing an order of the Appellate Division, holding that Petitioners’ claim against the decedent’s estate seeking to enforce an oral promise was barred by the Statute of Frauds. In overturning the Appellate Division, the Court held that the most important factor in overcoming the Statute of Frauds is whether the resulting injustice is in fact unconscionable.
In Hennel, the decedent’s grandsons allegedly reached an oral agreement with the decedent, whereby the parties agreed that the grandsons would ultimately acquire ownership of a parcel of real property in exchange for assuming all management and maintenance duties of the property. The Petitioners further asserted that the parties reach an agreement whereby the mortgage on the property would be satisfied from the estate’s assets.
To effectuate the oral bargain, Petitioners and decedent executed a warranty deed in which decedent granted ownership of the property to Petitioners. At the same meeting, the decedent executed a will which contained terms supporting the alleged oral agreement – namely that any mortgage in existence at the time of the decedent’s death would be paid off from the assets of the decedent’s estate. Following the meeting, the Petitioners assumed all management and maintenance duties in accordance with the agreement with decedent. However, in 2008, the decedent executed a new will, revoking all prior wills and codicils, which omitted all provisions concerning the satisfaction of the mortgage.
Following the decedent’s death, the Petitioners commenced a proceeding, pursuant to SCPA 1809, seeking to determine the validity of their claim against decedent’s estate. The Respondent objected, asserting that the claim was barred by the Statute of Frauds. However, the Surrogate’s Court ordered the estate to pay off the mortgage and satisfy the claim, reasoning that the claim fell “squarely within that limited class of cases where promissory estoppel should be applied to remedy a potential injustice.” The Appellate Division later affirmed the Surrogate Court’s decision.
However, the Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that even assuming the Petitioners were able to satisfy the elements of promissory estoppel, they would not suffer unconscionable injury if the Statute of Frauds were enforced. The Court went on to state:
“The strongly held public policy reflected in New York’s Statute of Frauds would be severely undermined if a party could be estopped from asserting it every time a court found that some unfairness would otherwise result. For this reason, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is properly reserved for that limited class of cases where the circumstances are such as to render it unconscionable to deny the promise upon which the plaintiff has relied”
(Hennel, 2017 WL 2799828 ).
Applying those principals to the facts before it, the Court found the Petitioners’ evidence was insufficient to demonstrate an unconscionable injury to overcome the Statute of Frauds. Importantly, the Petitioners were able to make all mortgage payments entirely from the rental income generated by the property. Moreover, the court noted that the Petitioners had the option of selling the property, satisfying the balance of the mortgage, and claiming the $150,000 of equity remaining in the property.
The Court conceded that the Petitioner’s loss was unfair. However, in overturning the Appellate Court’s decision, the Court reasoned that wherever an oral agreement is rendered void by the statute of frauds, some unfairness will typically result. The Court concluded that “what is unfair is not always unconscionable. For these reasons, cases where the party attempting to avoid the statute of frauds will suffer unconscionable injury will be rare” [id.].
Consequently, it is clear that applying the principles of promissory estoppel, to overcome the legal requirements of the Statute of Frauds, is a high standard that places a significant burden on the promisee. The promisee must demonstrate not merely gross injustice or unfairness but the showing of an unconscionable injury.