SCPA § 1404 requires that “at least two attesting witnesses must be produced before the court and examined before a written will is admitted to probate.” Very often, litigators think of examinations pursuant to SCPA § 1404 as examinations before trial that are conducted under Article 31 of the CPLR. But they are not. Hillary Frommer discusses this topic in our latest post.
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In a recent decision in the Estate of Grunwald (NYLJ Jan. 28 2019, at 33 [Sur Ct, Richmond County]), Surrogate Titone aptly noted that “the concept of domicile is … very important in the Surrogate’s Court.” True words indeed. Where a decedent is domiciled at the time of his or her death determines which
My colleagues have written on the enforceability of in terrorem clauses, and the courts continue to confront challenges in reconciling the testator’s intent to impose an in terrorem condition with the rights of beneficiaries to challenge the conduct of their fiduciary. The New York County Surrogate’s Court’s recent decision in Matter of Merenstein provides further
This is a common question from clients involved in litigation – – especially estate litigation. As a general rule, a party cannot recover attorney’s fees for successfully prosecuting or defending a lawsuit. This is the “American Rule,” and it is engrained in our legal system. New York courts are wary of deviating from the American
To object to the probate of a will, party must have a pecuniary interest that would be adversely affected by the admission of the instrument to probate. In Estate of Saunders, the Kings County Surrogate’s Court recently issued two decisions addressing the standing arguments of litigants in this context. Hillary Frommer discusses these cases in our latest entry.
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Very often, when the proponent of a will (and sometimes even the attorney-draftsperson or witness) is questioned about the decedent’s mental state and the decedent’s instructions, the reflexive response is that the decedent was “as sharp as a tack” and was “as clear as a bell.” But overselling a decedent’s capacity and clarity of communication using tired metaphors may result in the trier of fact becoming suspicious of the proponent, perhaps perceiving the proponent as dishonest where other evidence reveals that the decedent likely had diminished capacity. Frank Santoro discusses the issue of testamentary capacity in our latest entry.
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A recent case decided by the Richmond County Surrogate revisits the law pertaining to probating lost or damages wills. In Matter of Larsen, the decedent’s will, apparently damaged in a flooded basement to the extent that the signatures thereon were washed clean, was admitted to probate. Frank Santoro discusses the decision in our latest entry.
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Estate litigators arguably see more probate contests than any other type of conflict. While the details are always unique, they almost always include allegations that someone unduly influenced the decedent to change his or her will to either disinherit, or favor, a particular person. These cases also often include an allegation — which is usually contested — that the purported influencer was in a “confidential relationship” with the decedent. The frequency of such claims beg the questions (1) what exactly is a “confidential relationship,” and (2) what is the practical benefit to an objectant in establishing that one existed? Jaclene D’Agostino addresses these questions in our latest entry.
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Many estate practitioners are familiar with contested matters in which a charity interested in the proceeding is cited, as is the Attorney General, and both the Attorney General and private counsel for the charity appear in the proceeding. In such cases, both the Attorney General and the charity’s counsel represent the charity. What happens, however, when the status and identity of the charitable beneficiary is less than certain? That was precisely the situation facing the New York County Surrogate’s Court in the probate contest involving the much-publicized estate of Huguette Clark. John Morken discusses this portion of the Clark case in our latest entry.
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A recent decision of the Richmond County Surrogate’s Court addressed a frequently litigated issue in Surrogate’s Court litigation – – whether the proposed or nominated fiduciary should be disqualified from serving in a fiduciary capacity on the grounds of “dishonesty” or “improvidence.” In the Estate of George Mathai a familiar dynamic was in play –