A nominated executor is obliged to secure estate assets even before the issuance of letters testamentary, or preliminary letters testamentary (see Matter of Schultz, 104 AD3d 1146 [4th Dept. 2013]).  Courts have recognized that “an executor’s duties are derived from the will itself, not from the letters issued by the Surrogate” (Estate of Skelly, 284 AD2d 336 [2d Dept. 2001]).  Thus, as we have noted in a prior post, executors have been subject to surcharge for a loss sustained to estate property in the period between the decedent’s death and the executor’s receipt of letters from the Surrogate’s Court (see, e.g., Matter of Donner, 82 NY2d 574 [1993] [surcharging nominated executors for investment losses based on date of death values]; Matter of Kranzle, N.Y.L.J. 11/7/1991 p. 28, col. 1 [Sur Ct, Suffolk Co.] [surcharging nominated executor for interest and penalties on taxes due several months after decedent’s death, but before the probate proceeding commenced]).

Decisions addressing a nominated executor’s obligations in respect of estate assets before formal appointment by the Court usually arise from the fiduciary’s failure to act. A recent case, however, addressed the nominated executor’s obligations not in the context of an omission, but, instead, involved the fiduciary’s expenditure of funds to safeguard property that ended up not being estate property (Matter of Timpano (Brough), 2016 NY Slip Op 51770(U) [Sur Ct, Oneida Co.]).  Although the nominated executor’s actions may have been misdirected, the Surrogate permitted an allowance from the estate for these expenses as the actions were undertaken in good faith and, further, the Court cited the need to avoid deterring other nominated executors from taking immediate measures to safeguard estate property.

In Estate of Skelly, supra, the fiduciary was notified at the decedent’s funeral in May 1995 that she had been named executor.  It was undisputed that she failed to probate the will until November 1996, over one year after decedent’s death.  During that time, decedent’s real property, which was bequeathed under the will, was vandalized and damaged.  The person to whom the property was bequeathed sought damages for the loss.

The Surrogate denied the executor’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the objections, and the Second Department affirmed.  Even though title to the real property may have vested with the objectant on the death of the decedent, the Second Department found “there are issues of fact as to whether the [executor] failed to assess the assets of the estate and neglected to preserve the premises prior to probate.” (Skelly, 284 AD2d at 337).

In Timpano, the decedent’s sister, Georgianna, lived in a mobile home in Florida across the street from one in which decedent resided. Decedent died in April 2010 survived by his three children, Mark, Kelly and Robert. His will named Georgianna as executor.

Probate of decedent’s will was delayed by SCPA 1404 examinations and, following the testimony of one attesting witness, Georgianna withdrew her probate petition. Ultimately, the Oneida County Chief Fiscal Officer (the “CFO”) was appointed as administrator of the estate.

Believing decedent owned the mobile home in which he lived, beginning in April 2010 (the month of decedent’s death), Georgianna used her personal funds to pay lot rent to avoid confiscation of the mobile home and its contents. She further paid for electrical service to run the air conditioning to avoid mold and mildew so as to further protect the mobile home and decedent’s possessions therein. At no time did any of decedent’s children object to her covering these expenses.

In January 2011, decedent’s son Robert informed Georgianna that he had searched the title to the mobile home and found that his name was on the title. Upon learning this, Georgianna removed the decedent’s possessions from the mobile home and placed them in storage. She further stopped paying lot rent and electric bills.

When the CFO submitted its final accounting, decedent’s daughter Kelly objected to Georgianna being reimbursed for the expenses for lot rent and electric service. Kelly testified in support of her objections and, significantly, acknowledged that she too believed the mobile home was estate property before being told otherwise in January 2011

The Surrogate found Georgianna’s actions following decedent’s death evidenced her understanding that a nominated executor has an obligation to secure assets of an estate prior to formal appointment, citing Schultz, supra. Even though the will was not ultimately admitted to probate, the Surrogate noted, “Georgianna would have had no basis to anticipate this outcome when she acted to preserve decedent’s assets throughout 2010 and into early 2011.”

The Surrogate recognized that Kelly’s claim that if the estate did not own the property, it could not be responsible for related expenses, is true in a technical sense. The Surrogate, however, noted that to rule in Kelly’s favor would ignore the circumstances of the case.

After reviewing the cases holding that an individual who expends personal funds in good faith in furtherance of her fiduciary responsibilities is entitled to reimbursement, the Surrogate found Georgianna acted in good faith and should be entitled to reimbursement from the estate.[1] The Court reinforced its decision by reference to the following policy consideration: “to sustain the objections would be to instill a chilling effect on the work of nominated executors who are tasked with preserving an asset believed in good faith…to belong to the estate” (Timpano, supra).



[1] The Court directed that part of the expenses be charged against Robert’s share of the estate.

In a decision that could well cause even the most casual trusts and estates practitioners to scratch their proverbial heads in wonder, the Appellate Division, Third Department, in Matter of Buchting, 111 AD3d 1114, 975 NYS2d 794 (3d Dept 2013), recently affirmed the determination of the Surrogate’s Court, Greene County, dismissing a “due execution” objection to probate, notwithstanding that both attesting witnesses invoked their Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and refused to testify at their SCPA 1404 examination concerning the execution of the will, and notwithstanding that the Surrogate determined that summary judgment was improper because of “conflicts in the evidence.”

The petitioner in Buchting was the surviving spouse of decedent, who offered his will for probate shortly after his death.  The respondents were the decedent’s surviving children from a previous marriage. The attorney draftsman of the will (also the attorney who supervised its execution) testified at his SCPA 1404 examination in detail concerning the due execution of the will.  The two attesting witnesses were also called, but upon taking the stand, refused to testify, invoking their Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination.

The respondents objected to probate on the grounds of lack of due execution, lack of testamentary capacity, and undue influence.  They moved to dismiss the petition based upon the petitioner’s failure to establish due execution.  The petitioner cross-moved for summary judgment admitting the will to probate.  It appears from the Appellate Division’s decision that the Surrogate denied both motions, determining that summary judgment was improper because of “conflicts in the evidence,” but nevertheless dismissed the respondents’ objections and admitted the will to probate.

On appeal, the Appellate Division first concluded that the Surrogate properly denied the respondents’ motion to dismiss the petition because the petitioner complied with the requirement, imposed by SCPA 1404(1), that she produce the attesting witnesses for examination.  The court rejected the respondents’ argument that an attesting witness who invokes the privilege against self-incrimination and refuses to testify has not been “examined” within the meaning of section 1404.  It relied upon its prior decision in Matter of Hutchinson, 13 AD3d 704 (3d Dept 2004), in which it held that an attesting witness’ invocation of the Fifth Amendment “is akin to a failure to recall the events surrounding a will’s execution” (see id.).  It further noted that a will may be admitted to probate even where no attesting witness recalls it execution.  While the law requires the examination of at least one attesting witness, it imposes no requirements upon the substance of the testimony.

The issue, according to the court, “thus distills to whether there was sufficient other evidence to establish a prima facie case of due execution, and we find that there was.”  In this regard, the court relied exclusively on the testimony of the attorney draftsman and the presumption of due execution that resulted from the attorney’s supervision of the will’s execution.  The court determined that, in light of this presumption, the respondents had the burden to come forward with evidence contradicting the testimony of the supervising attorney.  It further determined that the respondents failed to meet their burden, notwithstanding that they “challenge[d] the veracity of the supervising attorney and argue[d], based upon various minor irregularities in the documents that she drafted, that she was unfamiliar with the necessary procedure. . . .”  Thus, according to the Appellate Division, the Surrogate properly denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition and dismissed the due execution objection. 

Notably, the court stated that “to preclude the probate of a will as a matter of law because both attesting witnesses refuse to testify on constitutional grounds would come perilously close to drawing a prohibited inference from the invocation of the privilege by nonparties” (id.).

The court held that the Surrogate erred, however, in dismissing the remaining objections, grounded in testamentary capacity and undue influence, particularly prior to discovery.

A few thoughts on the Buchting decision. 

First, it seems fundamentally unfair to saddle an objectant with the burden to come forward with evidence to rebut a supervising attorney’s testimony concerning the due execution of a will in order to survive summary judgment where both attesting witnesses — likely the only other persons in the room with the decedent – refuse to testify for fear of self-incrimination.  It is difficult to imagine how an objectant could ever meet that burden.  Forgive me for stating the obvious, but it seems plain that the mere fact that both attesting witnesses have invoked the Fifth Amendment in order to avoid testifying concerning a will’s execution should itself be sufficient to justify further proceedings before admitting the will to probate.  The decision in Buchting essentially ignores that a court is obligated by statute to “inquire particularly into all the facts” in order to satisfy itself “with the genuineness of the will and the validity of its execution” (SCPA 1408).

Second, the court’s decision is grounded in its determination that a witness who has refused to testify concerning the execution of a will for fear of self-incrimination is “akin” to a witness who fails to recall the execution.  However, the decision reveals no substantial authority for that comparison.  The Buchting court cites only Hutchinson as authority — but this is a chain without an anchor, as the Hutchinson court cites no authority (see 13 AD3d at 707 [“In our view, the submission of conflicting affidavits followed by a refusal to testify falls more closely in line with a witness who has ‘forgotten the occurrence’”]).  Another statement of the obvious — failing to recall a will’s execution and refusing to testify concerning the execution for fear of self-incrimination are very different things. 

Third, in order to conclude that the petitioner satisfied SCPA 1405(3) – which requires, as a condition for probate, the “examination” of at least one attesting witness – the court essentially determined that a witness who invokes the privilege against self-incrimination and refuses to testify has nevertheless been “examined.”  However, this seems to be in conflict with the Court of Appeals’ statement in Matter of Collins that, historically, the requirement that a witness be “examined” was “fulfilled when the witnesses took the stand and related what they knew of the circumstances” (60 NY2d 466, 471 n.3 [1983]).  Collins provides no authority for the proposition that a witness who refuses to testify altogether has nevertheless been “examined.”   

Fourth, even assuming a non-testifying witness could be deemed to be “examined” within the ambit of section 1405(3), that section requires actual testimony before a will may be admitted to probate.  It provides that where an attesting witness “has forgotten the occurrence or testifies against the execution of the will” the will may nevertheless be admitted to probate “on the testimony of the other witness and such other facts as would be sufficient to prove the will.”  But where the “other witness” invokes the Fifth Amendment, there is no testimony upon which to admit the will to probate.

Fifth, the court’s determination could well put a petitioner whose witnesses refuse to testify for fear of self-incrimination in a better position that a petitioner whose witnesses actually testify against the will.  A grant of summary judgment admitting a will to probate may be inappropriate where one attesting witness testifies against the will, even where the other witness and the supervising attorney testify favorably (see generally Matter of Jacinto, 172 AD2d 664 [2d Dept 1991]).  Why should the result be different where a witness – indeed, where both witnesses – refuses to testify concerning the execution of the will for fear of self-incrimination? 

Sixth, the presumption of regularity should not permit a court to turn a blind eye to facts calling into question a will’s validity.  A court should not employ a presumption where to do so would “elevate a legal construct above common sense” (People v Giordano, 87 NY2d 441 [1995]).  Even the presumption of legitimacy, “one of the strongest and most persuasive known to the law,” will fail if, in the words of Judge Cardozo, “common sense and reason are outraged by a holding that it abides” (Matter of Findlay, 253 NY 1 [1930]).  Depriving an objectant of a trial on the basis of the presumption of regularity, where both attesting witnesses refuse to testify concerning the execution of the will for fear of self-incrimination, offends both common sense and reason.

Of course, courts should resist the “temptation to overlook or ignore fixed legal principles when they are opposed to persuasive equities” because, as the ancient legal proverb teaches, “hard cases make bad law” (Dodd v Anderson, 197 NY 466, 469 [1910]).  However, “it might also be safely said that the occasional easy case makes law that is even worse” (People v Ramos, 40 NY2d 610, 628 [1976] [Jasen, dissenting]).  By placing undue reliance upon the presumption of regularity in order to deprive an objectant of a trial, in the face of facts calling into question the validity of the will, the court in Buchting made the case too easy, and established a troubling precedent.

In Matter of Smith, 2010 NY Slip Op 20381 (Sur Ct, Bronx County), Surrogate Holzman recently addressed a proponent’s motion to dispense with the testimony of an attesting witness at the SCPA §1404 stage of a probate proceeding. The subject witness had relocated to Florida since the date of the execution of the propounded instrument, and had been uncooperative with the attorney-draftsman, also the attorney for the proponent, for reasons unbeknownst to him. One of the respondent’s daughters opposed the motion.

Ultimately, after being contacted by an investigator hired by the proponent, the witness agreed to a deposition via video conference, assuming she would remain in Florida. Nonetheless, presumably due to disobliging nature of the witness, the proponent sought to dispense with her testimony. 

In support of her motion, the proponent argued that that a commission to obtain the subject witness’ testimony was unnecessary in view of the fact that the attorney-draftsman and one attesting witness had already been deposed, and the uncooperative witness had signed a self-proving affidavit at the time of the execution. She further asserted that she would consent to a commission to obtain the witness’ testimony in Florida only if the cost were borne by the party opposing the motion. Indeed, the proponent claimed that funding the commission would be a hardship for the estate because its only asset was a parcel of real property. 

In response, the opposing party argued that the cost of the commission could be covered by the sale of the estate’s real property, and that testimony of the second attesting witness was pertinent to clarify the events of the execution ceremony.

SCPA §1405 provides that the testimony of an attesting witness can be dispensed with under limited circumstances. Specifically, pursuant to statute the court must be satisfied that, if living, the witness “cannot with due diligence be found within the state or cannot be examined by reason of his physical or mental condition . . .” (SCPA §1405[1]). Thus, the only scenario in which an out-of-state witness’ testimony may be dispensed with is if his examination cannot be obtained with reasonable diligence; but if the testimony can be obtained, SCPA §1405(2) mandates that it proceed by commission upon the demand of any party. Accordingly, Surrogate Holzman denied the motion, granting the respondent’s daughter’s request that the testimony of the Florida witness proceed by commission.

With respect to the issue of which party would bear the costs of the examinations, the court explained that SCPA §1404(5) provides that the estate is to pay for either, “(1) the first two attesting witnesses within the state or (2) if there is no competent witness within the state, the witness without the state who resides closest to the county in which probate proceedings are pending” (Matter of Smith, 2010 NY Slip Op 20381 , *2 [Sur Ct, Bronx County]). The costs of all other examinations are to be governed by Article 31 of the CPLR (see SCPA §1404[5]). Thus, because one of the witnesses in issue resided within the state, the subject examination fell into the latter category.

According to CPLR 3116(d), “unless the court orders otherwise, the party taking the deposition shall bear the expense thereof”. Consequently, the court opined that because the respondent failed to present good cause to persuade it to deviate from that rule, respondent was to pay for the examination. The court further held that the respondent may proceed with the examination by video conference if she were to find it more cost effective than a commission, and, notably, that the proponent may renew her motion to dispense with the testimony if the examination were not arranged within 90 days of the decision and order. 

It appears that the latter portion of this holding is simply a logical extension of the statute. If the party who demanded the examination neglects to ensure its occurrence, it is arguably deemed abandoned. Interestingly, however, the statute includes no such provision.

In a rare venture into the world of trusts and estates and its most significant recent ruling regarding in terrorem clauses, the Court of Appeals in Matter of Singer, 2009 NY Slip Op 09265, reversed both the Surrogate’s Court and the Appellate Division, holding that a beneficiary’s conduct in deposing the testator’s former attorney regarding drafts of prior wills did not violate the in terrorem clauses in the propounded will. Specifically, the Court held that the safe harbor provisions of SCPA 1404 and EPTL 3-3.5 are not exclusive, and must be applied on a case-by-case basis. The decision has essentially set forth a two-prong analysis to determine whether a beneficiary’s conduct triggers an in terrorem clause, consisting of the following inquiries: (1) whether the conduct falls within the statutory safe harbor provisions, and if not (2) whether it violated the testator’s intent.

In Singer, the decedent had executed a last will and testament approximately one year prior to his death, in which he appointed his daughter, Vivien, as executor. He also created a corresponding revocable trust through which he bequeathed to Vivien his home, most of his tangible personal property, and the sum of $200,000. In the trust instrument, the decedent stated that Vivien’s inheritance was in recognition and gratitude for her extreme dedication and constant care. The decedent’s son, Alexander, received one-half of the remainder of the estate, to be split with Vivien, and each of Alexander’s sons was given a $15,000 bequest.


The will contained a typical, broad in terrorem clause, which stated, “if any beneficiary, shall, in any manner, directly or indirectly, contest, object to or oppose, or attempt to contest, object to or oppose the probate or validity of [the] will or revocable trust created by [the decedent], or any part of [his] estate plan, or any gifts made by [him], . . .” that beneficiary’s share of the estate would be forfeited (id. at *2). The decedent also included a second in terrorem clause that was explicitly directed at Alexander. That clause directed that Alexander “not take [decedent’s] daughter . . . to a . . . (religious court) or to any other court for any reason whatsoever . . . ,” and stated that if he did, the result would be the forfeiture of his and his sons’ inheritance (id.).

Continue Reading Court of Appeals: Extra Deposition Did Not Violate In Terrorem Clause

The due execution of a will requires that the elements of EPTL 3-2.1 be complied with before the instrument is admitted to probate. However, only substantial compliance with the provisions of the statute need be shown in order for due execution to be found. The meaning and scope of this provision has been the subject of judicial decision in recent years as evidenced by the following opinions:

Signature at the End of the Document

The provisions of EPTL 3-2.1 require that the decedent sign a will at “the end” thereof. The meaning of this provision was discussed by the court in In re Mobley, N.Y.L.J. Mar. 20, 2009, at 35 (Sur. Ct. New York County), in which the court was presented with the issue of whether the propounded instrument should be denied probate due to the irregular order of the signatures of the testatrix and witnesses.

Specifically, after the dispositive provisions of the Will, and the appointment of the executrix, there appeared preprinted two lines intended for the date and the signature of the testatrix. Those lines, however, were blank. Below these two lines was a pre-printed attestation clause, to which the date and signature of attesting witnesses was appended. Following the attestation clause there appeared a preprinted affidavit of attesting witnesses containing the names, but not the signatures of the attesting witnesses. Rather, on one of the lines for a witness, there appeared the signature of the testatrix.

In finding that the Will had been duly executed, the court opined that a testamentary instrument can be admitted to probate even if the procedure for execution and attestation do not take place in the precise order established by statute. In this regard, the fact that the signatures of the witnesses appear before the testatrix’s signature does not invalidate a will. Further, the court held that although the testatrix did not affix her signature immediately after the dispositive provisions of the instrument, but instead after the attestation clause and the preprinted affidavit of attesting witnesses, the signature of the testatrix nevertheless appeared “at the end” of the instrument as required by the provisions of EPTL 3-2.1. Indeed, the court noted that all dispositive provisions appeared before the testatrix’s signature.

 Accordingly, probate of the instrument was granted.

Post-Death Signature of Witnesses Invalidates Will

In re Estate of Lederman, N.Y.L.J., May 22, 2002, p. 19, col. 5 (Sur. Ct., New York County), two of the residuary beneficiaries moved for summary judgment denying probate to a codicil that contained a substantial pre-residuary bequest. A Will and four codicils of the decedent were offered for probate. Under the Will and three of the codicils, the decedent made some minor pre-residuary bequests and bequeathed 90% of her residuary estate to her niece and nephew, and a charitable institution. These instruments were prepared by an attorney who supervised their execution.

The contested codicil was executed approximately 10 weeks before the decedent died, and was a one -page typewritten instrument, labeled “Codicil.” Pursuant to its terms, the sum of $300,000 was left to the decedent’s caretaker. Although the decedent signed the instrument, it was witnessed by only one person, who was designated as the executrix under a provision of the penultimate codicil. The witness stated that she prepared the codicil pursuant to the decedent’s instructions, and that the decedent had informed her that the bequest was to be a bonus to her caretaker.

The individual residuary beneficiaries moved for summary judgment on the ground that the codicil had not been properly executed in accordance with the provisions of EPTL 3-2.1, since only one witness had signed the instrument. The proponent acknowledged the deficiency in the instrument, but nevertheless maintained that it could be cured by her husband, who was present in the room at the time the codicil was executed. The proponent requested that her husband sign the instrument as a witness, albeit after the decedent’s death.

The court denied the application, and granted summary judgment in the movants’ favor, finding that a witness cannot effectively subscribe a Will after the testator has died. This principle is designed to prevent fraud. Furthermore, the court found that the second attestation proposed would be unavailing since it would not occur within the thirty day period prescribed by statute.


The due execution of a Will requires that the testator affix his name or acknowledge his signature to at least two attesting witnesses. The provisions of SCPA 1404 require that at least two of the attesting witnesses to the Will be produced before the court and examined before a Will is admitted to probate. When an attesting witness is also a beneficiary under a propounded Will the question arises as to whether the Will can nevertheless be admitted to probate, given the financial interest of the beneficiary in the instrument. Under such circumstances, the law provides that a Will may be admitted to probate, but the disposition to the witness/beneficiary shall be void, if the witness’ testimony is necessary to admit the Will to probate.

The foregoing principles were recently applied in a case of apparent first impression decided by the Surrogate’s Court, New York County, in In re Estate of Wu, NYLJ, April 27, 2009, p.19. Before the court was an application by the executor of the decedent’s estate for an order directing the decedent’s brother to pay his proportionate share of estate taxes. The brother opposed the application arguing that the tax apportionment clause in the Will exonerated him from liability.

The decedent’s brother was the beneficiary of two life insurance policies on the decedent’s life, but also was one of the two attesting witnesses to the instrument. Under the circumstances, the court found that his testimony was necessary to the probate of the Will, and pursuant to the provisions of EPTL 3-3.2, declared the tax exoneration clause of the Will ineffective as to him. Specifically, the court reasoned that the provision, to the extent that it discharged an obligation of the decedent’s brother, was tantamount to a beneficial disposition to him, within the scope of the statutory dictates pertaining to witness/beneficiaries.

The court opined that while the result of its opinion was ostensibly harsh, it was not so harsh as to deprive the decedent’s brother of his inheritance, i.e. the insurance proceeds, albeit net of estate taxes. Indeed, the court noted that in most instances in which the statute is applied, the witness/beneficiary under the propounded Will is denied his entire bequest. Nevertheless, the court cautioned attorney-draftspersons utilizing a tax exoneration clause to be fully informed of the recipients of the testator’s non-probate assets in order to avoid unintended consequences.