My colleagues have written on the enforceability of in terrorem clauses, and the courts continue to confront challenges in reconciling the testator’s intent to impose an in terrorem condition with the rights of beneficiaries to challenge the conduct of their fiduciary. The New York County Surrogate’s Court’s recent decision in Matter of Merenstein provides further guidance to practitioners in assessing the kind of conduct that will trigger an in terrorem clause. It illustrates that the courts, in construing broad in terrorem provisions, will draw a distinction between conduct aimed at challenging the conduct of an executor and conduct aimed at nullifying a testator’s choice of executor.

In Merenstein, the decedent bequeathed his estate to his two daughters. His daughter Ilene was favored under the will – – she received 73% of the decedent’s residuary estate and was nominated the sole executor. His daughter Emma received 27% of the decedent’s residuary estate. The in terrorem clause in Merenstein provided as follows:

If any person in any manner, directly or indirectly, challenges the validity or adequacy of any bequest or devise to him or her in this Will, makes any other demand or claim against my estate, becomes a party to any proceeding to set aside, interfere with or modify any provision of this Will or of any trust established by me, or offers any objections to the probate hereof, such person and all of his or her descendants shall be deemed to have predeceased me, and accordingly they shall have no interest in this Will.

Decedent’s will was admitted to probate and Ilene was appointed executor without objection.

Emma brought a proceeding asking the court whether certain contemplated conduct on her part would trigger a forfeiture of her beneficial interest under the in terrorem clause. Her first question was whether a petition to compel the executor to account, and a subsequent petition to remove the executor in the event that the executor disregarded a court order to account, would trigger the in terrorem clause. That was easy. The court held, consistent with well-settled law, that a beneficiary will not trigger an in terrorem clause by demanding an accounting of an executor, by objecting to an executor’s accounting, or by seeking removal of the executor in the event of the executor’s failure to comply with an order to account.

Emma also asked whether she would trigger the in terrorem clause by petitioning for limited letters of administration giving her the authority to conduct an investigation into whether Ilene had fraudulently used the decedent’s credit card during the decedent’s life. This was another easy one. Consistent with well-settled law, the court held that a petition for the issuance of limited letters to pursue an investigation into whether there are assets of the estate in the possession of others, including someone who is also a fiduciary, does not seek to challenge the validity of the will or any of its provisions. The filing of such a petition and even a subsequent discovery or turnover proceeding would not cause the beneficiary to forfeit her benefits under the will.

The court drew a line however, when Emma asked whether filing a petition to suspend Ilene’s letters testamentary during the investigation into the credit card charges would trigger a forfeiture under the in terrorem provision. Emma claimed that such an order of suspension was necessary to prevent Ilene from interfering with her investigation as limited administrator. The court held that such an application would trigger the in terrorem clause. Such conduct, according to the court, would constitute an attack on the decedent’s choice of fiduciary. The court explained:

Seeking the suspension of Ilene’s letters pending any investigation that Emma may pursue and in the absence of any allegation of misconduct by Ilene in her fiduciary capacity is akin to a challenge to the testator’s choice of fiduciary as established under the will. The in terrorem clause in decedent’s will disinherits a beneficiary who commences a proceeding to set aside any of the provisions of the will, and therefore, the filing of this type of petition, which does not fall within the safe harbor provisions of EPTL 3-3.5 (b), would result in forfeiture in this case

Finally, Emma asked the court whether a petition to remove Ilene as executor in the event that Ilene was determined to have engaged in improper conduct with respect to the credit card charges would trigger the in terrorem clause.   The court declined to rule on that question. It did however, point out that the alleged credit card charges occurred while the decedent was still alive, and earlier in the decision, cited to Matter of Cohn, which was affirmed by the Appellate Division, First Department.

In the Cohn estate, the courts confirmed that public policy will bar the application of an in terrorem clause where a beneficiary seeks removal of an executor based on allegations of the executor’s misconduct in their capacity as executor, but will not bar the application of an in terrorem clause where a beneficiary seeks to remove or supplant an executor based on some other ostensible basis that constitutes an attack on the testator’s choice of fiduciary, or on the powers and authority given to the fiduciary by the testator. There, the courts recognized that an attempt to displace the testator’s chosen executors based on the allegation that such executors had failed to fully inform the testator of the compensation that they would receive as executors was simply an attack on the testator’s choice of fiduciary that would trigger an in terrorem clause similar to the in terrorem provision in Merenstein.

The court in Merenstein, like the courts in the Cohn estate, recognized that fidelity to a testator’s intent warrants a fact-sensitive inquiry in enforcing terrorem clauses. Based on Merenstein and Cohn, it is clear that a beneficiary would be hard-pressed to claim that a limited administrator should supplant an executor in representing the estate in a litigation where the executor has no conflict, has not failed to act, and has not engaged in misconduct as executor, without triggering an in terrorem provision like that in Merenstein. Similarly, a beneficiary should understand that petitioning for a limited administrator to perform some estate administration task on the mere allegation that the executor has bias or hostility towards the beneficiary because of some events that occurred between the beneficiary and executor while the decedent was still alive is sure to be considered a challenge to the testator’s choice of fiduciary. Such a challenge will trigger an in terrorem clause like that in Merenstein. When faced with an in terrorem provision like that in Merenstein, a beneficiary must consider whether it is challenging the conduct of the fiduciary, or attacking the decedent’s choice of fiduciary. There is a difference, and it could mean a forfeiture.

One of the most important considerations in creating a trust is selecting the appropriate trustee. Oftentimes this involves determining whether a corporate trustee is appropriate as either the sole trustee or together with one or more individual co-trustees. A corporate trustee’s experience and sophistication in both investment and administrative matters are commonly cited reasons for appointing such a trustee. A corporate trustee may further provide a level of objectivity that may be difficult for family members or other individual trustees to match.

In Matter of Sinzheimer, 2017 NY Slip Op 31379(U) (Sur Ct, New York County 2017), the Court held a corporate co-trustee that had been “removed” pursuant to the terms of the trust agreement was not required to deliver the trust’s assets to the sole individual trustee where the individual defied the instruction in the trust instrument to appoint a successor corporate co-trustee. The perceived objectivity on the part of the removed corporate trustee figured prominently in the Court’s decision sustaining its decision to withhold delivery of trust assets to the individual trustee until a new corporate trustee had been appointed.

The relevant facts in Sinzheimer are as follows. Ronald and Marsha, husband and wife, established an irrevocable trust which provided for income and principal to be paid to Marsha in the discretion of the trustees for her “health, support maintenance and education.” On Marsha’s death, the trust remainder is payable to a further subtrust which terminates after the death of the last surviving issue of the parents of Ronald and Marsha. The remainder is payable to certain named individuals or their estates.

Ronald died in 1998, about a year after the trust was established. Thereafter, an individual trustee resigned and Andrew, the son of the grantors, Ronald and Marsha, was appointed in his place. Before Andrew’s predecessor resigned, he exercised his power to remove the corporate co-trustee (the “Bank”), but no corporate co-trustee was appointed to serve in its place.

Andrew maintained that a successor corporate co-trustee is not required and declined to appoint one. With respect to the issue before the Court as to the Bank’s turnover of trust assets to Andrew, the Court noted, “[t]he issue is consequential because Andrew has announced his intention to exercise his discretion to distribute all principal to Marsha if permitted to serve alone, thereby terminating the Trust” (id. at 2). The Court further noted that after Andrew became a trustee, but before his refusal to appoint a corporate co-trustee, he and his mother, Marsha, requested a discretionary distribution to Marsha of all the assets in the trust. A Bank officer asked for the standard documentation to initiate the discretionary request process, but Andrew and Marsha refused to provide the information.

The Court found it was clear from the trust instrument that the settlors intended that a corporate trustee would serve at all times after Ronald’s death. The authorities on which Andrew relied were distinguished because none involved a direction in the instrument to replace a corporate trustee with another corporate trustee, as was the case here, which, the Court stated, was “a significant difference because the professional management and independence uniquely afforded by a bank could affect a court’s analysis of such a provision” (id. at 5).

The Court next proceeded to dismiss Andrew and Marsha’s claim that the Bank converted the trust assets by not turning them over to Andrew as trustee. The Court found that the Bank never asserted title to the trust account which is an essential element of a claim for conversion. Rather, the issue was the Bank’s right, under these facts and circumstances, to temporarily withhold delivery of the trust assets to Andrew. The record established that the Bank never unequivocally denied that Andrew, as trustee, had a right to the assets, but asked only that he first appoint a corporate co-trustee to serve with him or obtain a court order determining his right to serve alone. The Court held:

Particularly given Andrew’s stated intent to terminate the Trust without regard to the rights of the remainder beneficiaries – a class that does not include himself, a measuring life – the Bank’s position was reasonable. … The Bank’s uncontroverted conduct here was prudent and appropriate in the circumstances, particularly in consideration of its fiduciary duty to the remainder beneficiaries… (id. at 8)

Although the Bank had been purportedly removed pursuant to the terms of the instrument, it, nevertheless, had an ongoing fiduciary duty to the remainder beneficiaries. The Court found the Bank fulfilled that duty by resisting its removal and not turning the trust assets over to the sole individual trustee.

Notably, the Bank’s withholding of the trust assets from Andrew was found prudent notwithstanding that co-fiduciaries have an equal right to custody of an estate fund (Matter of Slensby, 169 Misc. 292, 295 [Sur Ct, Kings County 1938] (“every estate fiduciary, by virtue of his office, is entitled to the custody of the assets of the estate or fund. When there are two or more fiduciaries, each possesses an equal right in this regard …”); see also Matter of Schwarz, 240 AD2d 268, 269 [1st Dept 1997]). The justification for departing from this rule in Sinzheimer was clear. The Bank faced potential exposure to claims from the trust’s remainder beneficiaries if it delivered property to the individual trustee who may later be found to be without the authority to exercise discretion alone, as he said he would by terminating the trust in favor of his mother.

Having a corporate trustee is not appropriate for all trusts. The cost of a corporate trustee’s services is an important factor to consider in determining if one is appropriate. The personal family knowledge possessed by a family member or dear friend of the grantor usually serves as a compelling basis to select such an individual to administer a trust for his or her family. On the other hand, a corporate trustee is less likely to be influenced by emotions, personal agendas, conflicts of interest and bias, all of which can impair the orderly administration of a trust consistent with the grantor’s intentions.

Although one of the many duties and responsibilities of an executor is to marshal and appraise estate assets, and, depending upon the dispositive terms of the governing instrument, liquidate them for purposes of distribution, the fulfillment of these duties may, at times, result in fiduciary liability. In Matter of Billmyer, 142 AD3d 1000 (2d Dept 2016), the Appellate Division, Second Department, considered this issue, in an appeal from an Order of the Surrogate’s Court, Kings County (Lopez Torres, S.), which surcharged the executor for selling certain real property of the estate below fair market value.

The decedent died with a brownstone residence, located in Brooklyn, New York, valued at approximately $1.5 million. In her Will, she named four Lutheran charities and Adelphi University as residuary beneficiaries of her estate.

Two years after the decedent’s death, the executor entered a contract for the sale of the Brownstone residence to an acquaintance of his for the sum of $670,000. Prior to the closing, the purchaser assigned his rights under the contract to an LLC, and the sale was consummated shortly thereafter between the estate and the LLC. Three days after this sale, the LLC sold the subject property to an unrelated third party for the sum of $1,300,000, pursuant to the terms of a contract dated one month prior to the date of the contract that it had entered with the estate.

The executor then accounted, and objections were filed by the charitable beneficiaries and the Attorney General of the State of New York, as the statutory representative of the charities. Following depositions, Adelphi University and the Attorney General moved for summary judgment determining that the sale of the real property was for less than its fair market value, and surcharging the executor accordingly. The executor opposed, alleging that the property required extensive repairs prior to its initial sale, albeit without an explanation as to how the property resold three days later for almost twice the price. The Surrogate’s Court granted the motion, and surcharged the executor in the sum of $630,000, plus 6% interest from the date of the estate’s sale to the date of remittance.

The Appellate Division affirmed, opining that in performing his fiduciary duty, the executor was required to employ good business judgment. Further, the Court explained that to the extent the executor failed to satisfy this standard in the sale of estate property, he could be surcharged. However, the Court cautioned that a surcharge did not result simply upon a showing that the estate fiduciary did not obtain the highest price obtainable for an asset. Rather, it had be demonstrated that the executor “acted negligently, and with an absence of diligence and prudence which an ordinary [person] would exercise in his [or her] own affairs” (Billmyer, citing Matter of Lovell, 25 AD3d 386, 387 [2d Dep’t 2005]).

Within this context, the Court noted that the executor chose a real estate agent for the sale of the brownstone, who was based in Staten Island, had no knowledge about the Brooklyn real estate market, and did not actively market the property for sale. Moreover, the record indicated that the executor did not obtain an appraisal of the property at the time of sale or learn the fair market value of comparable properties, failed to visit the property for an extended period of time prior to sale, and was unaware of how the property was being marketed.  In addition, he sold the property to an acquaintance of his, when there was an unrelated third party ready and willing to buy the property for nearly double the price paid by the LLC.

In view thereof, the Court found that the objectants had established, prima facie, that the executor had breached his fiduciary duty and acted negligently with respect to the sale of the property. Further, it concluded that the executor had failed to submit evidence in opposition sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. Finally, the Court held that the Surrogate’s Court had properly exercised its discretion in awarding interest upon the surcharge, based upon proof that three days after the executor had sold the property, it was resold for nearly twice the original purchase price.

A nominated executor is obliged to secure estate assets even before the issuance of letters testamentary, or preliminary letters testamentary (see Matter of Schultz, 104 AD3d 1146 [4th Dept. 2013]).  Courts have recognized that “an executor’s duties are derived from the will itself, not from the letters issued by the Surrogate” (Estate of Skelly, 284 AD2d 336 [2d Dept. 2001]).  Thus, as we have noted in a prior post, executors have been subject to surcharge for a loss sustained to estate property in the period between the decedent’s death and the executor’s receipt of letters from the Surrogate’s Court (see, e.g., Matter of Donner, 82 NY2d 574 [1993] [surcharging nominated executors for investment losses based on date of death values]; Matter of Kranzle, N.Y.L.J. 11/7/1991 p. 28, col. 1 [Sur Ct, Suffolk Co.] [surcharging nominated executor for interest and penalties on taxes due several months after decedent’s death, but before the probate proceeding commenced]).

Decisions addressing a nominated executor’s obligations in respect of estate assets before formal appointment by the Court usually arise from the fiduciary’s failure to act. A recent case, however, addressed the nominated executor’s obligations not in the context of an omission, but, instead, involved the fiduciary’s expenditure of funds to safeguard property that ended up not being estate property (Matter of Timpano (Brough), 2016 NY Slip Op 51770(U) [Sur Ct, Oneida Co.]).  Although the nominated executor’s actions may have been misdirected, the Surrogate permitted an allowance from the estate for these expenses as the actions were undertaken in good faith and, further, the Court cited the need to avoid deterring other nominated executors from taking immediate measures to safeguard estate property.

In Estate of Skelly, supra, the fiduciary was notified at the decedent’s funeral in May 1995 that she had been named executor.  It was undisputed that she failed to probate the will until November 1996, over one year after decedent’s death.  During that time, decedent’s real property, which was bequeathed under the will, was vandalized and damaged.  The person to whom the property was bequeathed sought damages for the loss.

The Surrogate denied the executor’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the objections, and the Second Department affirmed.  Even though title to the real property may have vested with the objectant on the death of the decedent, the Second Department found “there are issues of fact as to whether the [executor] failed to assess the assets of the estate and neglected to preserve the premises prior to probate.” (Skelly, 284 AD2d at 337).

In Timpano, the decedent’s sister, Georgianna, lived in a mobile home in Florida across the street from one in which decedent resided. Decedent died in April 2010 survived by his three children, Mark, Kelly and Robert. His will named Georgianna as executor.

Probate of decedent’s will was delayed by SCPA 1404 examinations and, following the testimony of one attesting witness, Georgianna withdrew her probate petition. Ultimately, the Oneida County Chief Fiscal Officer (the “CFO”) was appointed as administrator of the estate.

Believing decedent owned the mobile home in which he lived, beginning in April 2010 (the month of decedent’s death), Georgianna used her personal funds to pay lot rent to avoid confiscation of the mobile home and its contents. She further paid for electrical service to run the air conditioning to avoid mold and mildew so as to further protect the mobile home and decedent’s possessions therein. At no time did any of decedent’s children object to her covering these expenses.

In January 2011, decedent’s son Robert informed Georgianna that he had searched the title to the mobile home and found that his name was on the title. Upon learning this, Georgianna removed the decedent’s possessions from the mobile home and placed them in storage. She further stopped paying lot rent and electric bills.

When the CFO submitted its final accounting, decedent’s daughter Kelly objected to Georgianna being reimbursed for the expenses for lot rent and electric service. Kelly testified in support of her objections and, significantly, acknowledged that she too believed the mobile home was estate property before being told otherwise in January 2011

The Surrogate found Georgianna’s actions following decedent’s death evidenced her understanding that a nominated executor has an obligation to secure assets of an estate prior to formal appointment, citing Schultz, supra. Even though the will was not ultimately admitted to probate, the Surrogate noted, “Georgianna would have had no basis to anticipate this outcome when she acted to preserve decedent’s assets throughout 2010 and into early 2011.”

The Surrogate recognized that Kelly’s claim that if the estate did not own the property, it could not be responsible for related expenses, is true in a technical sense. The Surrogate, however, noted that to rule in Kelly’s favor would ignore the circumstances of the case.

After reviewing the cases holding that an individual who expends personal funds in good faith in furtherance of her fiduciary responsibilities is entitled to reimbursement, the Surrogate found Georgianna acted in good faith and should be entitled to reimbursement from the estate.[1] The Court reinforced its decision by reference to the following policy consideration: “to sustain the objections would be to instill a chilling effect on the work of nominated executors who are tasked with preserving an asset believed in good faith…to belong to the estate” (Timpano, supra).

 

 

[1] The Court directed that part of the expenses be charged against Robert’s share of the estate.

One of the first reported Surrogate’s Court decisions of 2011 comes from Monroe CountyThe decision is interesting in that the court addresses various legal issues in the context of what it describes as “a power-sharing arrangement that is rather unconventional, even by today’s standards of Trust and Estate practice.”   The decision addresses an exoneration clause, the delegation of investment responsibility, the overriding duty of loyalty of fiduciaries, the Prudent Investor Act, the construction of wills and trust instruments, and the status of an “advisor” as a de facto trustee.

The inter vivos trust at issue was created in 1945, in conjunction with the grantor’s outright gift to the University of Rochester to create a clinic under the auspices of the University’s Department of Psychiatry. The grantor directed that Trust income be used to operate and maintain the clinic. The grantor named an institutional trustee (“Trustee”) and also created an “Investment Advisory Committee” comprised of three individuals, two to be named by the University of Rochester and one by the Trustee.

By the provisions of the Trust instrument, the Advisory Committee has considerable power and control over the investment of Trust assets. The Advisory Committee was granted “sole and exclusive power and control over the investments making up this trust fund, the sale of securities, and the reinvestment of any funds at any time in the trust estate” and given the power to direct the Trustee in writing in connection with such power and control. The Trust instrument also contains an exoneration clause, and provides that “[t]he Trustee shall be charged with no responsibility or duties with respect to the investment or reinvestment of trust funds, other than to carry out the written directions or communications received by it from the Committee.”

Approximately 65 years after the Trust was created, a disagreement arose between the Advisory Committee and the Trustee that required judicial attention. Specifically, the Advisory Committee directed the Trustee to invest all of the Trust assets in the University’s long-term investment pool, and the Trustee sought advice from the Court. 

The Court made clear that its task was to determine whether the proposed investment in the long term investment pool would frustrate the intent of the grantor.  It first addressed the intent of the grantor and the purpose of the Trust. Reading the Trust instrument as a whole, the Court found that that the Advisory Committee and Trustee were required to work in concert to promote the goals of the grantor to fund the operation of the Psychiatry Department. Although the terms of the Trust instrument quoted above confer broad authority upon the Advisory Committee, the Court held that such authority could not be used in contravention of the stated purpose of the Trust, and that the Trustee and the Advisory Committee, as a de facto co-trustee, share the fiduciary obligation to invest and manage the assets in a manner consistent with the purpose of the Trust. 

In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted the limits of the Trust instrument’s allocation of investment responsibilities to the Advisory Committee and the concomitant exoneration clause. The Court found that the exoneration clause employed in the Trust instrument, an attempt to render the Trustee completely unaccountable in deference to the Advisory Committee, is inconsistent with the nature of a trust, and void as against public policy.   If the Advisory Committee’s control over investment decisions was completely dispositive, there would be little sense in having a trustee.   According to the Court, while the Trustee is under a duty to comply with the directions of the Advisory Committee with respect to investment decisions, the Trustee cannot ignore its fiduciary responsibility; the Trustee could be held liable for abiding by the direction of the Advisory Committee where there may be reason to believe that the Advisory Committee is not fulfilling its fiduciary duty. 

The Court had several problems with the proposed investment in the long term investment pool. The investment would remove both the Trustee and the Advisory Committee from any role in administering the Trust assets. Trust funds would be transferred to the University’s custodian bank, and such bank would have no fiduciary obligation to the Trust. The funds would be managed by numerous investment management firms under the oversight of a subcommittee of the University’s Board of Trustees.   Once the Trust’s funds were invested in the long term investment pool, neither the Advisory Committee, nor the Trustee, would have input concerning asset allocation, or the discretion to select, retain or sell off any individual assets. Such decisions would be overseen by the subcommittee of the University’s Board of Trustees. 

Quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, the Court first noted that two of the three members of the Advisory Committee were employed by the University, and that the proposed investment would place the majority of the Advisory Committee, owing a duty of loyalty to both the University and the Trust, in a position of conflict if questions were to arise as to the handling of Trust funds in the long term investment pool.   The Court was “hard-pressed” to allow the majority of the Advisory Committee to be allowed to direct the investment of Trust assets in the long term investment pool under these circumstances. The Court acknowledged that the third member of the Advisory Committee was also in a potential position of conflict as an employee of the Trustee, but found that this third member’s conflict was less of a concern considering the minority status.

The Court also held that while delegation of investment and management functions is permissible under the EPTL, the proposed investment constituted a delegation far afield from what is permitted by statute (EPTL § 11-2.3(c)), and would be inconsistent with the Trust instrument.

This case is certainly worth a read.

 

The real estate market might be bad, but it’s not that bad.
 
In Matter of Karr, NYLJ 2/5/09 (Surrogate’s Court, Kings County), Surrogate Maria López Torrez canceled a deed by which the executor of an estate attempted to convey to herself, in consideration of $10, a house owned by the estate.  You can’t make this stuff up.

The defendant in the action, Joan Melluso, was the executor of her father’s estate.  He died in 1977, leaving his house in equal shares to his daughter and son, Joan and Donald.  He also granted Joan a life estate in the house, and included a clause in his will providing that “[t]he choice when and if to sell shall be hers.”  In 2004, Donald died intestate, leaving a wife and four children.  In 2007, Joan, in her capacity as the executor of her father’s estate, conveyed the property outright to herself for $10.  

Donald’s wife and children filed an action in Supreme Court seeking, among other things, a declaration that the deed conveying the house to Joan was invalid and that they retained a 50-percent tenancy-in-common interest in the house.  They moved for summary judgment.  Joan cross-moved to transfer the action to Surrogate’s Court.  The court denied the motion for summary judgment without prejudice and granted the cross-motion to transfer.  Ultimately, the fully briefed motion for summary judgment was submitted for decision to the Surrogate.

Continue Reading Court Rejects Executor’s Attempt to Sell House To Herself For $10

 Questions often arise regarding a nominated executor’s authority to commence an action on behalf of the estate prior to the issuance of letters testamentary.  These must be answered on a case-by-case basis.

In general, the authority of an executor “is derived from the will, not from the letters issued by the Surrogate” (see Matter of Yarm, 119 AD2d 754 [2d Dept 1986]).  Thus, the executor’s duty to preserve estate assets arises immediately upon the testator’s death. 

Pursuant to EPTL §11-1.3, a named executor of a will that has not yet been admitted to probate “has no power to dispose of any part of the estate of the testator before letters testamentary or preliminary letters testamentary are granted, . . . nor to interfere with such estate in any manner other than to take such action as is necessary to preserve it” (emphasis added).  It is the language of this statute, and the similar words of its predecessor, Surrogate’s Court Act §223, that the courts have used as a guide in determining the circumstances under which named executors without letters may commence actions on behalf of the estate for which they are nominated to serve.  Because the statute provides that a named executor may take actions that are necessary to “preserve” an estate, courts’ interpretations of the statute have established a fine line between those actions that are commenced for purposes of preservation, and those that constitute “active management” of estate affairs.   

 

          

Continue Reading Powers of a Nominated Executor to Litigate Prior to the Issuance of Letters