Photo of Jaclene L. D'Agostino

Jaclene L. D’Agostino is a trusts and estates litigator representing fiduciaries and beneficiaries in Surrogate’s Courts throughout the metropolitan New York area. Jaclene practice encompasses probate contests, accounting proceedings, discovery proceedings, and other miscellaneous proceedings relating to estates and trusts. She conducts pretrial discovery, legal research, and drafting motion papers.

 Questions often arise regarding a nominated executor’s authority to commence an action on behalf of the estate prior to the issuance of letters testamentary.  These must be answered on a case-by-case basis.

In general, the authority of an executor “is derived from the will, not from the letters issued by the Surrogate” (see Matter of Yarm, 119 AD2d 754 [2d Dept 1986]).  Thus, the executor’s duty to preserve estate assets arises immediately upon the testator’s death. 

Pursuant to EPTL §11-1.3, a named executor of a will that has not yet been admitted to probate “has no power to dispose of any part of the estate of the testator before letters testamentary or preliminary letters testamentary are granted, . . . nor to interfere with such estate in any manner other than to take such action as is necessary to preserve it” (emphasis added).  It is the language of this statute, and the similar words of its predecessor, Surrogate’s Court Act §223, that the courts have used as a guide in determining the circumstances under which named executors without letters may commence actions on behalf of the estate for which they are nominated to serve.  Because the statute provides that a named executor may take actions that are necessary to “preserve” an estate, courts’ interpretations of the statute have established a fine line between those actions that are commenced for purposes of preservation, and those that constitute “active management” of estate affairs.   

 

          Continue Reading Powers of a Nominated Executor to Litigate Prior to the Issuance of Letters

Should a surviving spouse remain entitled to an elective share even if the marriage was procured by fraud or undue influence exercised upon the decedent, or if the decedent was incapacitated at the time of the marriage?  In a recent case, Matter of Berk (20 Misc 3d 691 [Sur Ct, Kings County 2008]), the decedent’s estate opposed his widow’s notice of election alleging that circumstances of the marriage rendered it null and void ab initio, thereby eliminating her rights pursuant to EPTL 5-1.1-A.  She moved for summary judgment. 

The decedent died in 2006, leaving a will dated July 10, 1982.  The marriage occurred almost exactly one year prior to the decedent’s death; he was 99 at the time, she was 47.  Interestingly enough, the couple’s marital status had been concealed, and it was only after the decedent’s death that his family learned of the situation.  According to the estate, at the time of the marriage the decedent lacked the requisite mental capacity “to understand the nature, effect and consequences of marriage, or to enter into a marriage contract” (id.).  The estate further claimed that the evidence suggested that the decedent’s consent to the marriage was obtained by force, duress or fraud exercised by his widow.  The Court held that even assuming the truth of these allegations, they were irrelevant on the motion for summary judgment, and granted the widow her elective share.Continue Reading Right of Election Granted Despite Evidence of a Voidable Marriage