Last year, we posted an entry on Matter of Berk, 20 Misc 3d 691 (Sur Ct, Kings County 2008), a decision in which the court granted an elective share to a surviving spouse notwithstanding evidence that the marriage to the decedent, who was 99 years old at the time, occurred under highly questionable circumstances. The court’s rationale was that the marriage was voidable, not void. The Surrogate held that because the marriage was not invalidated prior to the decedent’s death, the right of election could not be disturbed.
In Matter of Kaminester, 2009 NY Slip Op 29429 (Sur Ct, New York County), the court addressed a similar set of facts, but with one distinguishing factor: prior to his death, the decedent had been adjudicated incapacitated in an Article 81 proceeding. This fact allowed for an entirely different result than that reached in Berk.
In Kaminester, the decedent’s estate sought a determination as to the validity of the elective share pursuant to SCPA §1421. As in Berk, the marriage remained a secret until the decedent’s death, and occurred mere months prior thereto. But in this case, the marriage also occurred two and a half months after a Texas court appointed a temporary guardian for the decedent, and during the pendency of an Article 81 proceeding in New York. Within the context of the Article 81, a temporary restraining order had been imposed with respect to removing the decedent from the State, among other things. The Article 81 proceeding resulted in the appointment of a temporary guardian, and a stipulation on the record that the decedent lacked capacity to marry. The decedent’s new “wife” was in the courtroom with her attorney at the time of the stipulation, but neither one revealed the existence of the couple’s recent marriage.
Notably, during this time period, the beneficiary designation on the decedent’s life insurance policy, worth over $1 million, was changed to favor his new “wife.” In addition, a deed was executed transferring the decedent’s Westhampton property to the couple as joint tenants with right of survivorship.
The “wife” filed a notice of election within weeks of the decedent’s death. Thereafter, the executor of his estate sought an order from the Article 81 court to hold her in contempt for violating its TRO. In response, the court invoked Section 81.29(d) of the Mental Hygiene Law, and “revoked and voided” the marriage, the designation of the “wife” as beneficiary on the decedent’s life insurance, and the deed that transferred to her a joint tenancy interest in his Westhampton property. The First Department affirmed these portions of the Article 81 court’s decision, accepting the posthumous voidance of the decedent’s marriage.
Surrogate Glen of New York County subsequently addressed the issue of the elective share, and thus the validity of the marriage, in light of these events. She discussed Section 7 of the Domestic Relations Law (“DRL”), the statute that had been relied upon in Berk, and compared it to Section 81.29(d) of the Mental Hygiene Law (“MHL”). DRL §7 provides that a marriage involving an individual “incapable of consenting to a marriage for want of understanding” is voidable, and becomes a nullity as of the date it is annulled. In contrast, Section 81.29(d) of the MHL “permits the court that appoints an article 81 guardian for an incapacitated person to “’revoke any previously executed . . . contract. . . . made by the incapacitated person prior to the appointment of the guardian if the court finds that the previously executed . . . contract. . . was made by the person was incapacitated’” (Matter of Kaminester, 2009 NY Slip Op 29429 at *5). Thus, the Article 81 adjudication was the lynchpin of the Kaminester decision.
In her decision, the Surrogate questioned whether the legislature had intended MHL §81.29(d) to override DRL §7. She also recognized that while she was bound by the First Department’s determination, the Second Department had previously taken the position that it had inherent power to override DRL § 7 by posthumously voiding a marriage due to the decedent’s mental incapacity (see Campbell v Thomas,36 AD3d 576 [2d Dept 2007]). Nonetheless, because of the First Department’s determination that the decedent’s marriage had been void ab initio as a result of his incapacity, the Surrogate opined that there existed no right to an elective share.
Notably, the result in Kaminester rendered the marriage in issue void, as opposed to voidable, which was the characterization in Berk. A voidable marriage is a nullity upon the court’s declaration, whereas a void marriage is deemed to never have existed. This distinction was based upon the fact that there had been an Article 81 adjudication in Kaminester, allowing for the application of MHL §81.29(d) after the decedent’s death.