A person’s standing to interpose objections to probate is governed by SCPA §1410, which provides that,

 any person whose interest in property or in the estate of the testator would be adversely affected by the admission of the will to probate may file objections to the probate of the will or of any portion thereof except that one whose only financial interest would be in the commission to which he would have been entitled if his appointed as fiduciary were not revoked by a later instrument shall not be entitled to file objections to the probate of such instrument unless authorized by the court for good cause shown.

The case law has firmly established that the interest that would be adversely affected must be pecuniary in nature (see, e.g., In re Hall, 12 AD3d 511 [2d Dept 2004]). An interest based on sympathy, sentiment, or anything other than the gain or loss of money is insufficient to confer standing.

Recently, the Kings County Surrogate’s Court rejected two different standing arguments in Estate of Saunders, a contested probate proceeding. First, in a January 2017 decision, the Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that sons of the decedent lacked standing to file objections (see Estate of Saunders, NYLJ, Jan. 27, 2017, p.35). Under the will, each of the sons was bequeathed $100, and the residuary was to be divided equally among three charities. Following the decedent’s death, the sons, as “sole heirs of the estate,” transferred all of their purported interest in real property owned by the decedent, which had become part of the residuary estate, to a limited liability company (id.). The petitioner claimed that as a result of that transfer, the respondents had no pecuniary interest in the estate that would be adversely affected by the admission of the will to probate. In opposition, the respondents argued that the cash bequests gave them an additional interest in the estate. They further argued that the estate indeed had cash. The petitioner conceded both of those facts, but asserted that the cash had been depleted through the administration of the estate. The court was not persuaded that the executor’s proper use of the cash assets for administration purposes determined whether the respondents had standing under the statute. It concluded that because the respondents assigned away only their purported interest in the real property, and not their interests as distributees of the decedent, they indeed had standing to interpose objections to probate.

The Surrogate addressed standing again in a later decision, when the LLC moved to intervene and file objections on the grounds that it was a good faith purchaser of the real property, and would be adversely affected by the admission of the will to probate (see Estate of Saunders, NYLJ, Mar. 1, 2017, p.25, col. 6 [Sur Ct, Kings County]). In an unpublished decision and order, the Surrogate found that the LLC lacked standing. Although we don’t know the court’s precise reasoning, its decision is not that surprising, as the LLC was not a beneficiary of the real estate under the will or prior will, and certainly was not a distributee or legatee of the decedent.

Not content to sit on the sidelines and rely on the sons’ objections to preserve its purported interest in the property, the LLC subsequently moved to renew its motion on the grounds that it had commenced a proceeding to quiet title to the property, which the Supreme Court stayed pending the outcome of the contested probate proceeding. According to the LLC, it would have no recourse to protect its interest if it could not intervene. The Surrogate was not persuaded. First, it noted that a motion to renew, pursuant to CPLR §2221(e) must be based on new facts that existed at the time the original motion was made, but were not presented at that time. The LLC’s motion was grounded on the Supreme Court’s stay order which occurred years after the original motion to intervene was made. The Surrogate sua sponte also considered the motion as one for reargument, pursuant to CPLR §2221(d), but again, found that it failed because the LLC did not claim that the Surrogate misapprehended the facts or law, but rather, advanced an entirely new argument, which is not a proper basis for such a motion.